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The CB4 Cotton Ilesearclz Project (hereafter the Project) is a 
study of development problems and policies  i n  a particularly 
crucial  sector of l the Dlozmbic~n economy. By cutting verti-  
ca l ly  tiirough the ecosamic, social  and pal i t icaz  aspects of 
cotton production, the Project' S researchers were able t o  
examine policy f o r  industqr as  well as  f o r  agrioultwe. Cot- 
ton i n  Nozambigue is  grovm by smallholders, by private farmers, 
by cooperatives, and by s t a t e  farms. Such diversity among the 
producers presents a wide range of the type of p~oblems in- 
volved i n  the transformation of the colonial economy through 
the development of collective foi-ms of production. Mozanzbique 
cotton production is, moreover, central  ito the process of 
sociaiis% accwulation, both because cotton i s  a11 export ear- 
ner and because it is the basis f o r  the eqanding local  te&ile 
industry, v~hich w i l l  provide vmge goods f o r  peasants and lmr- 
kers , 
Tlze Project vms not intended t o  develop a overall cotton stra- 
tegy, or  even to  siake proposals on part icular  probleiis, Tlze 
objective was t o  provide iyueomation i n  certain specific areas, 
which could then be used i n  planning cotton production, !The 
Cm considers the information t11at has been collected and 
analysed to  be part icular ly relevant fo r  the cfirorl: of 
Secretariat  of State  f o r  Cotton &-the PJationel Cotton Inst i -  
tute.  Nonetl~eless, since cottoia is an element i n  a iaa.tiona1 
strategy of transit ion, the ser ies  of studies produced by the 
Project clearly contains implications fo r  other sectors too-- 
especially Internal. Trade, Cooperative Development, aid the 
I ~ f i i i i s t ~ j  of Endust~~j ,  
This document i s  a guide t o  the ser ies  of Project reports fo r  
persons from various s t a t e  structures ~23.0 are involved ill ag- 
E i c a t w a l  or  industr ial  planning, linked to  cottoia production. 
The tex t  i s  orgwised into f o u r  chapters, wit11 a s t a t i s t i c a l  
appendix and a guide t o  inrportant doc~mentary sources. 
CI%iPTEii ONE outlilies some general problems facing 'lozam'bique' S 
national cotton industry, These problems clearly conditioned 
the choice of areas of study fo r  the Project t o  focus 011. 
CI-&PTEii T;:'O sketches the  lzistory of  the  clevelopment of T.'lozam- 
bigue's cottol? industry, attempting t o  explain laow a d  v~hy 
-the general problems described i rz  Kie first cl9apter emerged 
from -the ,colonial organisation of produ.ction, c.nd llovr ,the pat- 
teim was brolren a t  Independence. 
CIUPTEZ TI-B'ZE looks a t  %he implfca-tibns of the s e r i e s  of Pro- j ec t  reports  f o r  the development of a national  s t ra tegy f o r  
S : cotton production, 
CIWTEE F'OUI? presents a se r i e s  of smmaries of  the  ac-tual se- 
por t s  produced by the  Fro ject ,  Tkese samrnaries a r e  not in- 
tended t o  replace the close study of t h e  actual  te=:ts, but 
simply t o  in.dica-te how -they might be read 7sJr persoxls involved 
i n  cotton p l m i n g .  
The STAT1STICI"L f?PB\DII: consis ts  of the  systematic preseqta- 
t i o n  of exis t ing data 011 the  cotton sector,  with an explana- 
tory comentary, 
The CWts research has involved - h 5 1 0  m a l  research pro 'ects  
(Province of Nampule 1979; Province of Zambbzia, 19803 and 
two factory studies f~exmoque i n  Mampula; Texlom i n  tf~bola- 
~ ~ ~ p u t o ) ,  as w e l l  as  ~vork wit12 the  documentary and s t a t i s t i c a l  
sources. The CUils reports  a re  complemented by a. study COL?- 
ducted by the Norwegian I n s t i t u t e  of  I~zternat ional  APfairs(~1IA) 
on internat ional  cotton marlceting i;z re la t ion  t o  tloz8.mbique. 
During the course of t h i s  Projec*, the C u b ' s  researchers identi- 
f i ed  f ive  areas i n  vrI2iclz impor ta t  problens exist ,  A3.2 under-" 
standing of tlie relationship hetweeh these problems and the hig- 
to r ica l  evolution 09 the c ~ t t o n ~ ~ i n d u s t r y  i s  particularly imporm 
tan t  f o r  BTdzambiquets national cotton policy. 
Fi rs t ly ,  cotton production i n  caLo~ia1 i'lozmbiq~~e t ~ s  largely 
based on exhaustive e>ploi tat ion of  the s o i l  and t17.e use of a 
large molrnt of 1cCbou~, udtI .?_ l i t t l e  conceni f o r  increased pro- 
ductivity, In  order t o  uiderstand some of the socia.1 =mdl teclz- 
nicc.1 pi-oblems or" the re-organization of cattoiz production i n  
Mozambique, shai-ply distinguishable me-kllods of grovzing the ' 
crop can be couiterposed. In the first met:lod, cotton i s  grown 
as  a dry crop, using hand labour f o r  v~eedihg and picking, and 
renewing the s o i l  siaply by the use of r o h t i o n  crops and fal- 
low periods. If l ~ b o u r  cas ts  can be lield a t  c? low level ,  cot- 
ton c m  he produced quite clieaply i n  t h i s  way; hourever, there 
are a number of disadvantages, 
-- T3e use or" labour i s  seesonal, =ad worlrers must have 
alternative enlploymen"c81icl1 w i l l  leave them f ree  
t&en tI3.e~ are needed to  ?dPk on the cottoii crop. 
-- Cotton is  vulnerable t o  nmerous pests and diseases, 
t o  drougl~t, and t o  ra in  laclr o f  sus?. As a re- 
su l t ,  levels  of production vary widely from year t o  
year, &nd producers must e i ther  have large f ~ ~ i d s  i n  
reserve, or  not depend conlpletely on the revenue 
from cotton. 
-- Continuous cotton cul tiva.tion e:&2~us-ts the so i l ,  snd 
natural f e r t i l i z e r s  =d fallouaing awe t?ot normally 
able t o  arre5i;l-l; the process. 
J J 1  these disadvantages can be overcome by using various tee!.- 
nical  inputs and by 11Lgf.i levels  09 mecl-ranization. For e3:axiple2.> 
since cotton i s  not a food crop tn~eeds can be k i l led  Izerbi- 
cides, and mec3rranical picking does not necessarily harm the 
quality of the f ib re  i f  defoliants are used, The use of fun- 
g i c i d e ~ ,  herbicides, aid! i r r iga t ion  can prevent wide var ia t io~is  
i n  cot-icoii yields, but all of ti?.enz imply the acceptance e i ther  
of 3ig3 costs of production or  large-scale iyrvestment. In 
addition, since ~nacl?_inenj and inputs sdust be imported, suc!a 
hi@? costs must be borne out of foreign exchange earnings. 
Secondly, of the problems identified by the Project, cotton 
production nomally requires a f a s t  and efPicient transport 
system, lin2ring producers a - ~ d  processers, i n  order t o  keep 
costs Low and to  msintain the qua-lity o f  f ib re  and seed. 
Seed .co-t t~n is chea.p and bullnj, ai~d must e i ther  be %loved quick- 
l y  and i x i  large quantities, or  else  it must be giimed aild 
baled cldse t o  the point of production. A.11 
and inefficient trans$or-t systern  rill. adcl t o  costs, md allow 
rapid degeneration of both f ib re  and seed through processing 
delsys o r  inadequlate storage, Both productlvitjt and quality 
w i l l  suffer,  
Tlze processing and marketing res t r ic t ions  of cotton production 
present an tmderdeveloped ecoi?omy 'ritiz par t icular  d i f f icul t ies .  
, 
-- In the absence of ' transport and ~tb*dge facYlities; 
giixlilqx plants must be close t o  t h e  paint or" produc- 
tion, Such p1an.t~ v1iL1 o p e r ~ t e  oi~ly' im~lediately 
a f t e r  the harve$t, w i t >  the I.iIc3-i?-?00~l of very low ' 
productivity. <. 
-- SimiJ-arly, the nz11ce-t;iri.g of cotton i s  botla seasonal 
azd highly specialised, and it is d i f f i cu l t  t o  coor- 
dlnate it wi-61 the developmelit of an ef f ic ient  re- 
gional marketing system. 
---The developmelit o f  an ef f ic ient  cot-ton mar1cet;ing in- 
f rastructure is a cwnulative process vfizic?.2 requires 
continuity over -[;he years. A co~mitment t o  t h i s  pro- 
cess tends t o  uiake i-t hard to  d t e Y  prbductio~i pat- 
terns i n  response to  vaxyiiig mwl.ret coliditibns, 
Thirdly, na-tional CO ttorz production requires an ef f ic ient  ap- 
paratus of  researcl-1 and agricultural. esrteiision, i f  the product 
i s  to  compete effectively 012 the world. market, and i f  farmers 
are t o  successfully combat new species of nests  or  blights. 
'LJ orld cotton production is  based on coiastm-t e:periments with 
new s t ra ins  vrlzic!?. are more pest-resistant, of  higher quality, 
and more suitable fo r  varied local cohditions. The cost of 
maintaining a resewclr networl.; of W l i s  m e  is disproportioiiately 
i n  2x1 C C O ~ O P I ~ ~  a:$lic;~. lacks a general infra-struchre of ag- 
r icul tura l  research slnd e:zteiasion. FLartZ?er, ~.Jl?,,eii c< t ton  i s  pri- 
lnarily prodwed by snzall-holders ratlaer -ha? Large units,  ex- 
tension systems tend t o  be bo t1.z iiief f ic iene  amcl expensive. 
Eius it is  tha t  research and extension uni ts  l i k e  Ii.2ozmbj.que's 
rJationa1 Cotton Ins t i tu te  f i i ~ d  it hard t o  keep LIP wit11 iiew 
teC:micaI developmeiits; are costly t o  rut?; a14 t i e  tlie econoqr 
in to  cottoii prodwctio~~, l i k e  the marketing system, regardless 
of market chm-ges, 
~o&lrly, world cotton production and trade is  so styuctui-ecl 
as t o  make it extremely d i f f i cu l t  f o r  tlie ~mderdevelope~ econo- 
mies t o  influence l price movemeiits, Cotton i s  produced a d  ex- 
ported by Both the USA a d  t?l.e UssI l  ( the l ~ ~ r L d ' ~  most* higliLy 
developed ind-ustrial economies), and by some pf the v~orld' S
poorest na.tioiis, For many of these l a t t e r  countries, cotton 
is the i r  riajor foreign exchange earner, a.ltliovgh t:?eir share 
of the narket is minimz.1, and they a-Fe the:-efore ill-equipped 
to  establish favourable marlret coi~t_rol.s, The US Gover~~nent S 
policy of price-sq3por.t~ f o r  dofiles-ti~ cotton limited price 
Pluctua.tions on the ~ ~ o r l d  narlcet f o r  maiy years, Since tbe 
abolit ion of this price-support systefill, lzo.c.~ever, dramatic price 
f luc tu~. t ions  have pi7eveii-tec! effective plmming by those 
TI?.irS! i l f ~ r l d  cotmtries ~1~5icl1 rely oil cotton e;ports. The USSl;fs 
position c7.s a major errporter L i m i t s  t3.e possibility of replac- 
ing the old colonial preference systems by net7 srgz~eernel-rts with 
the soc ia l i s t  urorld, 
Lastly, 0% the Pive problem areas identified by the Project: 
the dyzmlic 'role cf cotton procluctio~~ iia tile national economy, 
'c:~rou& i t s  c o n ~ e c t i o l ~  with .  the development of  -i;11e dolilestic 
t e x t i l e  ii-dustry , i s  of-ten limited 1317 e;tcessively '_:.igI~ produc- 
t ion  costs i n  the t e ; ~ t i l e  industry itself. One of -the strong- 
e s t  arguments fo r  naintaining cotton production i n  Ptfozmbiq~~e, 
despite cotloi-*S role  as  an almost ent irely es.cpor% crop i n  
colonial times, i s  %??at it i s  m j-i~~portmqt rsv~ mma-kerial- f o r  
the devd oping domes t i c  -6e~:tiJ- e ilidus try. B L I ~  the industry 
requ-ires the contin~lous import of machinery slid iiiputs, and i f  
existing productive cepa-city is under-utilised, it c m  become 
costly 2nd inefficient,  In n1211y Third r:o,rld co~mtr ies  domes- 
t i c  t e x t i l e  inclustrigs have become a. d:.ra_iiz WC. W-e ~ C O Y L O I ~ ~ T ,  
ra.tI-.er than a d~~namisirig~ force. 
Hone of these probler~s is peculiar t o  ff'lozaxilbicpe o r  i ts stra- 
tegy of soc ia l i s t  t r a s f o - m a t i o i ~  ILlost Third ..!orld cotton pro- 
du-cers, including those scrmbling f o r  a footl~old on the 
cap i t a l i s t  road, face the sane d i f f icul t ies ,  Indeed, even 
col-ovLial pmclucers i n  pre-Independence F'iozambique found tha t  
cotton was not very profitable i n  terns of the labour, market- 
ing, and ginning needed t o  produce it, as  we shal l  see belowr. 
But the significance of these pyoblems a d  -the rsnge of pos- 
. , 
s ib le  solutions mst be located *r~ithin blo-zanbique~s overalL 
strategy of soc ia l i s t  development. E3.e f ollo~ring examples 
may suggest the way iii w5ic!2. this vrorks 
-- Seasoi~al deinand f o r  labour creates economic p ~ o b l e i ~ s  
in a capi-ta.list economy, In colonial Ilozaabique t ~ o  
d i s t inc t  solutions byere adopted. Tke first vra.s 
forcelt culture of food crops l i k e  cass3.va9 u~hicll in- 
t e r f  ered muc!~ less than millet  o r  SOT~!IUII wit11 -be 
cotton cklenda..r, The second was the recrt~ibilent of 
' a special la.bour force a f  women a.nd children fo r  the 
colonial f ams, But seasaaaL del-izmd foi- labour i n  a 
soc ia l i s t  economy i s  2 pol i t i ca l  problem, as well as  
an economic ~ i ~ e ,  because it i ~ t e r f e r e s  wit11 the 
building of a strong, stable labour force ~~11ich is  
the organised base o f  social t r a i z s f  ormation. 
-- In  a cap i t a l i s t  enterprise, the clze~pest solutioli t o  
the problem of recruit ing lo~r-cost labour may trell 
be greater mechanisation. In  tke context o f  a 
I socie-list strategy, hcrtd~ever, tile decision to  invest 
i n  ri~achinerj is nzde 2s par-t of  3 general calculation 
to  deternine the leading sectors of f2-e economjr, and 
also t o  ensure productive emplo:,ment a ~ d  a baslc 
standa~cl of l iving f o r  workers'. 
-- The orienta-tioi~ of  extension work can determine vf i~ ic l~  
f oms of  productf on v i l l  enjoy conpetitive adv~~itages.  
For instance, afthough e2isting cooperative f a m s  are 
ihef f ic ienl ,  a soc ia l i s t  strategy might suggest th2.t ' 
they s:-3oulcl b'elief it from e;rtension work, rather than 
the crrrrently more productf ve sinall cap i ta l i s t  fanners . 
-- By pe-mdttiiig the distribution of comercij l  prof i t  
ii? certsiiz vrays, the Stete  ca.n encourage sone types 
of producers and discourage others, Small capitsllist 
enterprises are.  allo-csred to  sel l  t12eir otvn cotton f ibre;  
by pexmitting cooperatives, f o r  example, t o  do the 
sane, they woUd clearly gain m economic ad.vmtage 
over ssaall-holders , 
-- T3r.e existence of  the ~~orker-peasa~-t.s-t a l - l i a~ce  requires 
tha t  incentives be used to  s t i ~ ~ u l n t e  t31e vo1un"Lx-y 
establis1,7mentoof new forms of  production among -t'ze 
peasantry, i n  order t213.t~ fo r  instance, the trading 
of agricultural  comodities f o r  mznufrctures such as  
clo-& w i l l  be to  -kke peasa.ntst advantage. If Zxigli 
productioli costs i z ~  the locel  t e x t i l e  i ~ ~ d u s t r y  are 
t ra is la ted  into high prices of clot12, t!.~en the  rc"zi.1- 
ure of t3e tr2.d.e-off presents a ~?o'l,itical ss well a s  
an economic problem, 
The ser ies  of repor-i;s produced by C2.e i3rojecttouc~-! 01-1 these 
and other ques-l;ians of the transform-tion 09 cotton prodwc- 
t i o n  within a general s o c i d i s t  - s - t r a t e ~ ~ ~ ~  AS background 10 
the readingg of the reports, it. is  also i?-ecessap-y t o  consider 
the geiielr21 l ines  of developmen-t: of  t11e r!loziu~lbica~~ cotton 
industry i n  colonial+ tirxes, and the  challenges t-~l?.ich it Paced 
at Independence , - ,  
jc' * 
CHAPTER II : TI-E EVOLUTION O F  COTTON PRODUCTIOlJ 
I N  MOZM4l3IQUE: 
T* purpose of t h i s  chapter i s  not t o  construct a 11istoi-y of 
cotton i n  Plozmbique, but t o  t race the emergence of tlie cen- 
tral problems of the contemporary cotton inclustry, A s  a re- 
sUt, the treatment is schmatic,  organised around a. period- 
i sa t ion  of two phases of the colonial economy,(1936-1961, 
and 1962-1971&), and the years since IndependenCe (1975-1 980). 
It is important t o  recognise tha t  there V T ~ S  a sharp change 
of direction i n  1962 both i n  the organisation of capi tal  and 
i n  the foms  of exploitation of the peasantry i n  cotton-pro- 
ducing areas. This break played a role  i n  the development 
of the present strv-cture of the industry. For each of these 
tlwee periods, the f ollovdng topics w i l l  be addressed: 
production of seed cotton, processing, commercialization, con- 
sumption of f\fozanbican cotton, and foms  of s t a t e  intervention, 
F i r s t  Period: 1936-1961 
Summary: 
The Portuguese s t a t e  i n i t i a t ed  cotton production i n  Ibzmbique 
i n  a1 attempt t o  reduce the dependence of the Portuguese tex- 
t i l e  industry on imported raw cotton. Capital, wclz of it 
foreign, vsas persuaded t o  invest i n  the construction of ginning 
factories  i n  the colonies by means of special concessions to  
ensure profi tabi l i ty .  T h e s e  conditions were met even though 
colonial cotton vras sold i n  Portugal below world market prices. 
taken included forcing peasant small-holders t o  pro- 
duce cotton; the pan t ing  of commercial monopolies within 
fixed zones of cultivation; fixing the price paid t o  peasant 
producers a t  the lov~est level  i n  Africa; reducing shipping 
ra tes  fo r  cotton; granting t a r  incentives; and credi t  and 
marketing f a c i l i t i e s  i n  Portugal via  the s t a t e  organisation 
Junta de Exportacao de iLlgodao (hereafter JU). UltJtough some 
of these steps had been taken i n  the 11920~~ the rea l  expansion 
of cotton ,production i n  Ibambique occurred a f t e r  1936. 
l. ' 
~roduct ion of Seed Cotton: 
The peasantry were fdrced t o  grow cotton i n  nearly1 all those 
par ts  of I!lozambique unoccupied by plantations o r  colonial 
fams,  and wl~ere climate and s o i l  permitted -- and occasionally 
i n  unfavorable areas as  well, Cotton cultivation became the 
main means of exploiting the peasantxy $n the northem pro- 
vinces of Nampula, Cabo Delgado and Niassa, which had previously 
acted principally a s  labour reserves f o r  the plantations, In 
the central  and sou-tliemr~provinces, men were e i ther  forced 
in to  contract labour on plantations, o r  migrated to  Soutlz 
Africa or  i-thodes$.a, - Cotton was cultivated i n  these areas by 
vromen, o r  by men too old , o r  infirm f o r  tvage-labour. 
The map (Fig. 1) shovrs the principal cotton-growing areas of 
Nozambique and the chart  ( ~ i g ,  2) sl?ovrs how cotton production 
evolved i n  the regions over nearly forty years, The dominant 
position of Nampula Province re f lec t s  the existence of so i l s  
and clima-be. sui-eable for-  co.t;tan- production over most of i ts 
area, a s  well a s  a large and a g r i c u l t ~ a ~ l l y  active population, 
Cotton cultivation- rewmd eonstan-t survei l lmce and .the use 
of force by the local  administrdtion, by the subordinate 
"trailitionalQ authorit ies (cabos -and regulos) , and -by the 
capatazes employed by Uie concessionary corilpanies. These l a t -  
t e r  cl?os-e and measured out- the new fi-el-ds, monPtcrred .planting 
and weeding and beat the tardy or  rebellious o r  reported them 
t o  po l i t i c a l  authorit ies f o r  fur ther  punishment, To f a c i l i t a t e  
this lxind of control as  vrell as  the marketing of the coop 
peasants had t o  regroup'their  f i e ld s  along roads (picadasj 
vddcln they were obliged t o  cut through the bush and then t o  
maintain. I 
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since c ~ ~ t t ~ Y 1  gmt.uing u&es land both intensively ahd e:ctenSively, 
serious pxoblws. .af s ~ i l  exliaustion, especially: i n  Nampul.a, 
began to  emerge. To make mat-kers 7:rorse, the peasants had been 
forced t o  cut back on food production, part icular ly of g r a i ~ s  
because they competed with cotton, There were several severe 
famines i n  the 'I9!:.Os ~ ~ h i c : ~  an be'linked direct ly t o  tlie ex- 
pansion of cotton cultivation, The administration attempted 
t o  resolve the s i tuat ion tIwough forced cassava cultivation 
i n  many of the cot-to-i areas, By tlie A950s there .rere also 
some attempts t o  introduce systematic crop rotation i n  the con- 
centrated settlements known as  concentracoes algodoeisas, 
The atteap-ti was made i n  the 'I950s t o  eliminate cotton produc- 
t ion  i n  areas and anong populationsi,oP loar p~oductivi'cjr. This 
was probably the most important factor  i n  raising the produc- 
t i v i t y  of the cotton sector dwing t h i s  period, ad Was based 
on a JWL s o i l  survey of the 'en-t'ire c o U ~ t q .  Detailed recorn- 
mendations were made f o r  withdrav~al i n  some areas and expan- 
sion i n  others. Suc4 decisions must ref2ec-b economic in teres ts  
a s  well as ecological conditions, of cousSse : cotton growing 
t@as dropped i n  &to It'IolocuE so tha t  vriCE-i the development o f  
t ea  plantations i n  northern Zmbtlzia, the area could real ize 
i t s  potential  as a food-growing area. 
The resu l t  was tha t  peasant cotton produc-tion rose during the 
1950s t o  a peak of  139,7!:-0 tomes of s e e d ~ c o t t o i i n  1959-1960, 
even' though the number of cultivators was lower and the area 
i n  use only s l ight ly  larger  tl!.an i n  the 191!-0s, The follow- 
ing table (Fig. 3) show production and productivity i n  the 
peasant sector fo r  selected years from 191!-3 t o  1962, 
FIG.3: Production of Cotton i n  the Family Sector:. 
Selected Yea-rs 
... "". *I 
l a 
Note: For th.e more detailed figures, see S t a t i s t i ca l  Appendix. 
-
Processing: 
Until 19663 the ginning of seed-cotton, which is  an industr ial  
act ivi ty,  -tms always organised alongside the rnmketing of 
peasant-pmduced seed-cotton, I n  other words, each ginning 
factory had a zone of influence within whick the company own- 
ing it had an absolute monopoly on the purchase of seed-cotton. 
Pdgqaagt- I($* - 5 % )  s h o ~ ~ ~ s  the zones of each of the  major cotton 
companies as they were i n  1953. Of course, larger  companies 
wit11 several factories could slzift seed-cotton from one plant 
t o  another a.s levels  of pmduction or  storage conditions 
The major giwLer VES the Cornpahia dos Algodbes de T~locambique 
(number 8 on the map)* 11J2aicl~ dorlliaiated cottolz commerci~lization 
i n  Mam~pula and operated &lz ianb6zia 211d Cabo Delgado, Some 
of the slnaller colup&ie,q. yere actually branches 09 mz.jor 
cap i t a l i s t  concemzs , $bWz the, Cornpaidlia Industrial  Joao 
Ferreira dos Ssntos (no. '1'1') and the Sociedade ~llgodoeira de 
Niassa (no. 9) viere par t  of the Jogo ierreira  dos Santos 
group, v~liich had major comleiciaS_ and ' agro-industrial in teres ts  
throughout the nortM, i n  export-inport, s i s a l  plantations, 
rice-polishing, a d  cotton-ginning. 
The commercial monopolies eqjoyed by gilmers 1;~itlzin t h e i r  zones 
and %he state-guaranteed supply o f  cheap r a . ~  cotS0i1 removed 
competitive pressure within t5e gLming industnj i t s e l f ,  
Since tlze rea l  source of p ro f i t  was comercia.lization, the 
State  had great d i f f icul ty  i n  persuading the comganies t o  
modernise t he i r  f a c i l i t i e s .  The ginners also fa i led  "c di- 
versify into the production of cotton by-products, o i l  o r  
pulp, altlzough the g~?ovrt;h of urban food markets i n  the 'I950s 
had lilade cotton-seed a marketable product. Instead, the gin- 
ning companies sold t he i r  wastes $0-. gpcel capi te l i s t s ,  often 
Indian, V T ~ O  press.e_d the oil' --&d e3qoxrcted -tKe pulp. ... 
One of the cbnditions a2 t2ie .Lotton concession was tha t  the 
company had t o  buy a l l  the cotton pxddueed by the peasantry 
i n  the zone of influence of i ts"-factobj .  This m e a t  ( m d  still 
means) t h a t  a large transport f l e e t  h d t o  be available t o  
reach the ser ies  of small. local  ~narlre ! S t o  ~zhicll peasants car- 
r ied t he i r  cotton, 14arlreting :?as t o  be done quic1d.y during 
the few months between the harvest and the rains. Cotton corn- 
panies l i k e  JFS, with l inks t o  diversiFied cofimercial activity, 
could use t he i r  ovm lorr ies .  Other companies sub-contracted 
the work t o  private truclrers o r  used s t a t e  vehicles,- 
, l . -  -. 
The companies had t o  p27 tl.re-peasants prices s e t  by the s tgte ,  
which varied by province and by, d i s t r i c t  .according t o  cofnplex 
calculations of different  costq of ~comercialization. The 
price also varied according t o ,  the quality of the cotton, . 
v.rhicl~ had t o  be graded by the peasants themselves. TZiis 
classif icat ion of quality was &one a t  the market, and neither 
the peasants nor the stake had inuclz control over the process; 
the companies, of course, used the opportw~-tTJr t o  squeeze a 
l i t t l e  extra p ro f i t  from the peasantry by exa.ggerating the 
quantity of LOTJ-grade cotton. 
In  thhe first f e w  years of cotton production, the state-controlled 
prices varied according t o  tlze market, In  491!-3, Izowever, there 
were 1-arge-scale peaseat protests against the very 1-ow price 
of 0B77 per kilo s e t  fo r  tha t .  year, and the .State decided t o  
s e t  up a fund, bnth t o  ac t  as  a hedge against price fluctua- 
t ions and t o  support cotton progrm-es. The price paid t o  
peasants w2.s tIzus s e t  even lower than before against the mar- 
ket price,  and e share of the surplus tvss direct ly a.ppropri- 
ated by the State. 
The table below (~ig.L!-) sbov~s average prices paid f o r  f i r s t  
and second quality cotton ill Zmb6zia f o r  selected years a f te r  
1 9118 p when the Inso-grade sy stern we S introduced, There wa.s 
'no s%ingle national price f o r  cotton un t i l  1962, JAlongside> 
the  provinciciL average prices are shown figures fo r  the 
cost of l iv ing inder,: i n  Lowenco FTarques (~apu to )  f o r  the 
same years. This i s  admittedly inadequate measure of l iv-  
ing costs among the peasantry, but it does indicate general 
price movements f o r  basic man~factured comodities. For the 
f u l l  m of prices m d  3a alternative gr ice  calculation by 
N.S. Bravo (-1963: 182-3), see the S t a t i s t i ce l  i:ppe~itli:: to  
-t11$s report. 
FIG.1;: The Evolution 'of Prices Paid t o  Peasant 
Producers V$ per 
I!e sha l l  discuss the ev6lution of prices further i n  Ykte sec- 
tions below an the 1960s and on the post-independence period, 
It is enough to  point out here tha t  these prices are said t o  
have been the lowest paid t o  easant oUtiva.tors i n  the vriiole 
of AfPi~a. (Flapril Gauveia 196 
The Market f o r  P4ozambicai Cotton: 
The agreements bettqreen tlae consessiona.ry companies and the 
Govermment stiptalated tha t  a l l  cottos produced i n  Nozambique ;,. 
was t o  be offered f o r  sa le  i n  Portugal a t  a price t o  be s e t  
by the  Government. This trms originally s e t  well below the , 
world ma-rlret price, f avowing the domestic t ex t i l e  industry 
and saving foreign exchange. In  return the concessiona.ry com- 
panies were guaranteed e secure market with asswed profi t -  
ab i l i ty ,  tI3xrough the neaswes already discussed, The most 
important of these FTZS the depressed price paid t o  the 
pea.sscrat producers. 
I~lozambicai- cotton played an important role  i n  the growth of 
the Portuguese t e x t i l e  industry, as a comparison of the sources 
of Portuguese cotton imports i n  194.0 and 1950 clearly slzows. 
In  19b-0 Portugal imported about 24.,000 metric tonnes of cot- 
ton f ibre ,  of vr11ich 19 per cent tr~2r.s 1I/1ozanbicanS 16.5 per cent 
was from Angola, and 64.5 e r  cent frora elsewhere, By 1950 
Portugal was importing 33. E 37 metrio tonnes, Only 4 per 
cent  as produced outside her colonies, and inuch of tha t  was 
of special quality; of the res t ,  76 per cent cane from 1-Zozm- 
bique and 20 per cent from Angola ( ~ a l e n t e  1951: 35-6). 
The Portuguese t ex t i l e  industry continued to  expand i n  the 
IgSOs, and was eventually consuming much. more cotton t' L I ~ B  the 
colonies could produce. The plcoportion of non-colonial cotton 
consumed by the industry begm t o  r i s e  again, a id the price 
paid t o  the  F'lozambican concessionary companies &so began to  
move up towards the v~orld market level. ~~Iozambique began to  
diversify i ts exports s l ight ly,  se l l ing  l i n t e r  and lower 
grade cotton; by 1960 up t o  10 per cent of Mozambicm cotton 
product exports went t o  countries other than Portugal. The 
protective ban on the development of a P.lozmbican t e x t i l e  in- 
dustry began t o  be l i f t e d  i n  the 1 9 5 0 ~ ~  wlien a m i l l  was 
opened a t  Chimoio. By 1960 1,870 tonnes of 14ozambican cot- 
ton -- a small proportion of production -- was used by the 
local  industry. The consoXidation of Portugal's t e x t i l e  in- 
dustry, i t s e l f  based on s t a t e  subsidies made a t  the e 4 ~ e n s e  
of llozambican and Pagolan peasant producers, vms what made 
these c!ianges possible, 
Foms of State Xntervention: 
From 1938 to  1962 the colonial State acted prgmarily as  a 
dArect agent of the Portuguese tesrtile industry and of the con- 
cessionary companies, 'Ike local administrations forced pea- 
smCs t o  produce cotton and supervised t E 2 e 1 ~  tlrhile they d i d  so. 
The JEA extended credit, controlled. exports, aad conducted 
some basic research on production conditiqns. The Agronomic 
Inst i tute began investigating new varieties and growing 
methods, 
O f  course, the stake was  forced to  mediate certain contradic- 
tions, be-tv~een buyers and sel lers ,  for  instance, or  between 
companies battl ing t o  appropria-te productive and accessible 
areas or t o  dump w?proC!uctive or inaccessible ones. Tlze State 
was  also more concerned 9r&t9 the long-term reproduction of 
t2e cotton system than the coropanies were, It sho~i~~ed some 
concern with such problems as so i l  exhaustion and malnutri- 
tion, and t r ied t o  push 'the companies to  modernAsre their  
ginning factories, On balance it is f a i r  t o  say, however, 
that  a l l  the peasant producer got, from the State was 
surveillance, 
Second Period: 1962-1974 
Summary: 
'Tlnie organization of cotton productiod and ma-rkeling began to  
cliawige i n  the eayly 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  to  allow cap i t a l i s t  s e t t l e r  farms, 
empToying peasants as  seasonal wage-v~orkers , t o  take ove3r. 
:The ginning ccompanies cost t he i r  i-nonopoly on the purchase of 
cotton; cap i t a l i s t  farms could export t he i r  cotton fribre di- 
rect ly;  the newly-established Cotton? Ins t i tu te  ( IPJI )  designed 
active agricul-t;ural extension and credi t  programaes f o r  
cap i t a l i s t  farmers; and forced labour was nominally abolislied. 
It was not un t i l  the end of the ' 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  l?owever, tha t  the f u l l  
impact of these cl?.anges began t o  be f e l t .  Their ef fec t  was 
p a r t h u l a r l y  d~amotic a f t e r  1972, vrheli the vrorld cotton price 
rose and many s e t t l e r s  lnoved into cotton from other crops. 
Nevertlzeless, tl~roughout ,tZ~e 'l960s the production of cotton 
contYMued t o  depend on the peasmtry, a.nd it PTas not uitil 
1970/71 t l ~ a t  s e t t l e r  production out-ci~eighed tha t  of t11e 
peasants. Groups of peasants using advanced techniques and 
specialisihg i n  cotton :?ad begun t o  emerge in certa.i.1~ areas 
i n  the 1960s; but i n  reality i f  not i n  law p e a s a t  cotton 
production was forced prod-uction un t i l  'l969/71. 
Prbduction of Seed Cotton: 
The major s t ructural  change i n  cotton cultivation between 
1962 and 1971!- was the grovstI~ of ~ 3 ~ p i t a l i s t  e t t l e r  gaming, 
as  the graph of n ~ t i o n a l  production trends shows ' (~ ig .5 ) .  
Tlze first sharp increase i n  s e t t l e r  production began i n  1968, 
and wit11 the improvement of world barket prices i n  the 1970s 
more and mare s e t t l e r s  moved into cotton, By the end of the 
colonial period they dominated prod-uction. Se t t l e r s  were 
able t o  appropriate prime cotton land, or  t o  pay only nominal 
prices f o r  it; often t l ~ e f l a n d  had been cleared by the peasan- 
try f o r  picadas o r  f o r  the concentyac5es algodoeiras; md of 
course, the set t lePs clustered i h  areas where good roa 1s 
provided the  best-' access t o  the ginning factories,  
* .  
Capital is t  cotton farming developed differefitly from region 
t o  region. It was in Nan~pula tha t  it found its strongest 
base, iJdthoug1.1- one of the  larges t  cotton farm concentrations 
i n  *he early ~ 9 6 0 s  was the Elugeba nucleus near 'P'iocuba i n  
Zamb6zia9 the peasants still ou-tFreighedi the s e t t l e r3  i n  the 
province as  a vhole, with l i t t l e  signi$icant change, throu@'+ 
out the decade. * ' In  Nmpula, on the o'ther hand, the propoP- 
t ion of se t t l e r  production had increased sl?arply by the l a t e  
196Os, as Fig, 6 shows, The dominance of cotton capital is ts  
i n  N q u l a  was not simply a result of suitable ecological con- 
ditions and-plentiful labour; it was also a question of giving 
th i s  group an econoinic stake i n  an area potepltiqlly under 
threat from J?N&IMO, The cotton capi ta l is ts  included a few 
1\/Iozmbican autonomos, edxperimenting wi th  ploqg'as ,and renting 
tractors. 
The size of the cotton enterprises varied considerably, in- 
cluding colonatos, middle-sized fams,  and a number of plan- 
tsttions, In both ZmbtSzia and Nmpula some s i s a l  plantations 
had introduced cotton as an intercrop in the 1960s~ t o  hedge 
against the fa l l ing price of s i sa l  on the world market. But 
i n  general, cotton holdings were small: a t  the end of the 
colonial period per cent of the cotton farmers i n  N q u l a  
were working l e s s  than 50 ha, Productivity i n  the capita- 
l ist sector rose steadily t4nrou&uwt the 1960s. In 196,2/63 
the average yield for  the northern provinces was 461 kg. per 
hectare; by 1972/73 it wSs 1,025, Better management and the 
increasing use of insecticides were probably responsible for  
the improvement, Fert i l izers  were rarely used even t1.zoug.h 
the same f ie lds  were under cultivation f o r  prolonged periods. 
A s  a result  tlze s ta te  fams and cooperatives formed on these 
lands af ter  Indepenclence iyl11erited a legacy of exhausted soils ,  
The rapid growth of the se t t l e r  fm$ meant, of course, a 
paral lel  r i se  i n  the demand for seasonal wage-labour, Some 
peasants t d ~ o  had been driven off good cotton land by the set- 
t l e r s  turned t o  occasional wage-labour, and other workers 
were recruited by the use of administrative pressures, espe- 
c ia l ly  a t  harvest time. By the early '1970s upward presswe 
on wages had led t o  substantially increased daily rates of 
pay (although the piece-rate for the harvest was unaffected), 
threatening the pmfftabi;l-f ty  of the s e t t l e r  farms, Tlze sit- 
uation was resolved when the end of forced cultivation i n  tlze 
family sector released labour for  recruitment, and when s ta te  
extension services t o  the family sector i n  certain areas were 
cut back, Tl~e history of the se t t l e r  farmers vras thus in- 
separably bound up with tlzat of  the peasant cotton cultivators. 
The formal abolition of  forced labour i n  1961 did not $pad t o  
any discernible changes i n  the s t r u c m e  of peasant cotton 
pruduction, a t  l eas t  a t  the national level  f see Fig. 4, y g e  55 ) . 
The jagged highs and lows of the grsph of production con lnue 
from year to  year, but there is  no evidence of an overall de- 
cline i n  the levels of production, The number of cultivators, 
and the area of  land under cultivation did not decrease: 
productivity measured by hectare o r  by producer does not r i se  
appreciably. Througliout the 9960s the price of first-quality 
cotton remained,at 3g80. There is  thus no evidence that  
price incentkves had replaced force as the motor of peasant 
production-, , , l  
, " i n '  
There are, however, certain cl~anpes i n  peasant patterns of 
production a t  tlx2 ,regional level(pig, 2 , -  p, 5 3. ) In  the pro- , ' L 
vinkes soutlz of"the river S ~ v e ,  peasant cotton productiun 
declined in the 19608, altl~ough the developaent of $rrigated:;; 
s e t t l e r  farms partly corapensated for  th is ,  In conkrast, c ,  
peasant production i n  N q u l a  and Zamb6zia actually ,rose 
during the decade, It was iri the 3960s that  the peasants of ' 
Mampula produced over l!..O,OOQ tonnes f o r  the first time; 
Zambezian p e ~  s a n t  families coxisistently ppoduced, close to  
30;QOO tomes per year i n  the second half of the decade. 
In bo?A provinces some of the specialised peasant cotton far- 
mers a'lready 'mentioned, of ten hiring tractors and regularly 
using insecticides, were beginning t o  reach high levels of 
$Poduc ti.vity, '; 
In the 1970s, l?_otnrever, there was a basic change \in the way 
l that  administrative J pressures and the extension vrork of  the 
Ins t i tu te  'wer'e uSed-.l ,, ThiS " change, and the rapid growth of $he 
s e t t l e r  sector, ' e f f e ~ t i v e l y  abolished the forced ca t iva t ion  
of cotton i n  the major areas. In 1970/71 natiornl','prcsduction 
' i n  the f ami.1~ sector f e l l  t o  l!-1,000 tonnes from, d'previous 
leve2. of ,83,500 tonnes. The drop cannot be e :~qined solely 
'in terms o'f me bad weather of that  season, partlctibarly 
since the -6dttl'er ,farms increased the i r  output ,-.qt the same ' 
time, , Despf t e  some improvement i n  production the f ollol~rilzg 
year, 1970/71 was a tuming;point f o r  peasant cotton Panning 
i n  !4ozardbi~i.&. , l  - -  'Tr,T12e qmb6r +of cultivators,-:,the area under cot- 
ton p;ro@qqtion; and -the t o t a l  output a l l  beg& t o  f d i  sharply 
In  1967 some 545,000 peasan2;s produced 'I25,WO toqnes'of cot- 
ton; i n  19?3-:the 2811_,OOO proeucers still active grew only 
57,000 tonneai- (. j. , 
' 8  1 . 
The end of 'ldrge-scale forced :cotton cultivation and the re- 
duction of the large numbers of small peasant producers were 
necessary i f  the se t t l e r  farms, with theis  enormous appetite 
fo r  seasonal Labotw, were to expand. Buk It was tl1e reorgan- 
ization of cottaa rnarlreting, m d  the abolition of the cam- 
panies' monopolies, which made cot-Don profitable for the first 
time for  the s e t t l e r  famers. 
I I I ,. 
> ' 
c -, . 
rl3arketi ng $ 
The struc-l l ink  between ginning and comercialization of 
cotton was bpoken for  the firs+ tihle i n  -'/96l!-. Although the i r  
factories  retained the i r  zones of i e luence ,  tl2e former .con- 
cessionary companies had t o  bid against other fims each year 
f o r  the r ight  t o  market cotton vritlaliY1 a part icular  zone, 
$gokk importantly, independent producers and cooperatives 
sotaLd e:~qsort t he i r  cotton themselves. Capital is t  farmers had 
previously been able t o  negotiate t he i r  own prices v ~ i t 3 2  t h e .  
companies, and had received, on average, pa~yments 20 per cent 
higher than tlzose offered t o  the peasantry ( ~ r a v o  4963: +185), 
Nonetl~eless, t he i r  bargaining position had still been too 
weak f o r  them t o  inake a p ro f i t  on cotton i n  most years. 
PiIost of the  ex-concessionamj compam?ies continued i n  practice 
t o  market peasant cottotz produced i n  t he i r  factoriesf  zones 
of influence. The new system even allowed them t o  withdraw 
from the 'riiarket vd~en conditions were unfavourable, since tlie 
netrrly-forned Jnst i tuto 'e Algodao ( P M )  taras clzarged witlz com- 
mercialization i n  any zone not bid fo r  by a private f i rm,  
PIost of the northem crop of '1964 was marketed by IAM i n  t h i s  
manner, a f t e r  Cf@I '-refused t o  bid i n  protest  againIlt the new 
system. Later on Lcul marketed low-grade Zarnbezian,-leotton when 
private traders wotf!.d not buy it, * .I ' <. 
t 
A s  the s e t t l e r  s e c t ~ r ' ~ a n d ,  independent nzarlreting expanded, the 
n u ~ b e r  of cotton traders registered witli IAI.1 pmlfferatedd i 
and the share of cottoh production marketed by certain ginrz- 
ing companies lessened. ClQ4 was partic~?!_a.rly hard-hit, f o r  
i ts  tradi t ional  zones of influence were i n  those very par t s  
of Nampula tdiere cap i ta l i s t  farmers and cooperatives were 
strongest. In  the 1969/70 season CM3 had elqorted 16,1~78 
tomes  of ginned cotton; i n  1970/71 the figure dropped t o  ; 
5,590 tonnes, The rea l  proii-ts ofctlae concessionarty~co~anies 
had always come from marketing, not from ginning, The evi- 
dent post-Independence prof i t  c r i s i s  of C&"i can be seen, then, 
t o  have had i t s  roots i n  the period of the r i s e  of the inde- 
pendent s e t t l e r s ,  I , 
Although the ~%arIceting companies had to  bid on the prices they 
proposed t o  pay f o r E r s t  and second grade cotton, the peasants 
did not necessarily receive those prices. After 'i962 the 
Sta te  set a national pr ice f o r  each quality of cot-ton, and 
the difference between tha t  pr ice and the amount of the bid 
went t o  the budget of IJM. The price of first grade cotton 
i n  N m  ula had been increasid from S10 - t o  3fl0 i n  1961, and 
i n  196 E it went up further t o  #8~.ber  kilo. The ginning 
companies, outraged by these p r i & ~  rises, threatderie t o  aban- 
don their  concessions. No furWzer inkreases followed urrki.1 
1971 , and the major price hike to 8#00 per kilo took place 
only  i n  1973. 
Processing: 
In  the new marketing structure, the ex-concessionary companies 
had to  gin the cotton being exported by groups o f  capital is t  
produce~s, as well as - the cotton tl>ey puTchased tl-iernselves. 
The IdJI s e t  the price that  they toad charge, and t12l.s v~a-S 
the subject of rancoumus debate between tlie coinpwiies and 
-tl-ze grovTers. The ra te  for  most factories wa.s s e t  a t  2,250$00 
per tome of cottoql f ibre  i n  '19G8, but under pressure ifom$- 
the growers was  subsequently lowered t o  I ,900@0. It di'6 not 
go up again unt i l  1973/74. 
The estrblishnent ,of rnarke%ing cooperatives of cotton growers 
i n  some areas--CPDI-\JI of  Nampula, Cooperativa P-gricols de 
Caia, Ui'JICOOP, sad. others--further undercut -the ginning corn- 
panies' position. Some of the cooperatives planned t o  build- 
the i r  ovm ginning factories so that :'t;37,ey would re-kaia the 
share o f  their  profi ts  tLat went to the company ginners, 
C4DPJ:f bui l t  such a f ac-koi;~ jn f~1l;rpul2', cz~tting into tCNv2t S 
area of  influence. Simmilt&@ogsly f 2-cto~ies were closed i n  
areas where cotton prod-uction had been cut back, either be- 
cause of %-he progress of the Liberation Struggle o r  because 
forced labour 1za.d ended, Thus~-tJaagmo ii$ Inhariibane province 
closed down. af ter  1973, and, F~laliate stopped work i n  Cabo Delgado 
a f t e r  the 1971/72 campaign, 
Markets for  Mozambican Cotton: 
Domestic c o n s ~ t i o n  of cotton, mostly by the Chinlaio m i l l ,  
remained steady through the 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  hut' r9sg sharply .- 2n 1973 
when the new Texlom m i l l  vras opened &~l -Na.puto. 140St -of the 
cotton f ibre  produced i n  Mozanbique was  expfirited, reaching a 
figure of L!I!-.MK) tonnes i n  1973 (see Fig. 7, i n  the Appendix, p.  57).  
The 2%zmbican classification system for  cotton was reorganized 
i n  l ine  vrorld specifications ill the early 196Os, i n  theory 
so that  lfozambican cotton could be marketed internationally, 
In practice, I?.ot~ever, ,most 09 the o u ~ u t  contlnued %o go to  
To~"twga1. The ginning c~mpazies had direct l inks w i t h .  Portu- 
guese tex t i le  rims; the independent grov~ers generally depended 
an the XNl t o  find buyers, who were almost always Portuguese 
t o .  It was qnly by the very end of %he colonial period tha t  
other markets began' t o  be reached, wit21 perhaps '15 per ,cent 
of baled cotton going elsgvrhere than Portugal (see S ta t i s t i -  
c a l  ~Ippendix) .
Foms of State  Intervention:" 
As we have already seen, ' the Instri'tuto :de JUgodao de . "locam- 
bique was founded i n  1961, The existence of the ~~ VTSS i n  
f ac t  a pre-condition both fo r  the abolition of forced culti-  
vation i-n 1962, aid the abolition of the concessionavy com- 
panies' monopolies t'ne fo l l o~dng  year. Before 1961 the role 
of the State Inad been prirnsril-y t o  ac t  as the companies' 
agent i n  cotton production, and t o  resalve differences and. 
curb abuses which threatened the system. State intervention 
through the IBJ.1 i n  the ' 1 9 6 0 ~ ~  l owever, was oriented tot~a..rds 
the needs of the s e t t l e r  sector i n  relat ion to  peasant pro- 
duction, The State's position was tha t  of botli agent of and 
intermediary beb7een different sectors of capital*> !his ,is 
clear  from the range of ac t iv i t i e s  undertaken by the IPJ.1- 
during the decade, 
-- It took over the basic tasks of extension sad of di- 
rec t  control of peasaxit production f ron the ' compm- 
i e s  and the colonial administration, (Forced cul t i -  
va.tion opera.tes through general supervision, oriem- 
ta t ion  of mar!zeting, a supply of seeds, res t r ic t ion  
of otlzer cul t~wes ,  and only occas2onal use of - I  
violence). The ca. atazes vrorking fo r  the companies + were integrated into ne IATi!, a~ld a better-organized 
national system melded e-trtension and contx-01 viFith the 
introductFon of new inputs and variet ies ,  
-- Basic research on rotation of crops, variet ies ,  fer- 
t i l i z e r s  and insecticides had formerly been under- 
taken in a desultory way by JUL and the l~gronomic 
. I Ins t i tu te ,  "The IN!i took this over and integrated it 
into excperimentab p?ograrmnes aimed both a t  the  de- 
velopment of s e t t l e r  farming and the iinprovement of 
peasant production i n  selected areas of part icular  
, promise, 
-- The IN,I s e t  the prices t o  be paid t o  the peasants 
and the ginning-rate charged b3r %he factories. It 
supervised the marketing of p e a s a t  output, and 
acted as  reserve buyer i f  there were no bids i n  a 
I 
.- part icular  zone, or  i f  a buyer could not fulfil the 
marketing plan, 
-- In  new areas of ~ettIDernent,-~eq?ecially colonatos, 
. .tri?.ere cotton production vrqs t o  be developed, the 
'11Q;l invested i n  the necessary infrastructure, -1 t
dug we$ls i n  Cabo Delgado, , Nmpula, Inhambane, and 
Gaza; it opened Ganamentos (settlement schemes) 
i n  Manica, Sofala, Tete, Zamb6zSa and Ffaputo,. c. 
mese were part icblar ly intended f o r  the integration 
of demobilized colo@al troops. 
-- I n i t i a l l y  the IbJl provided credLt t o  cap i ta l i s t  cot- 
ton-growers and some small famns, and l a t e r ,  a f t e r  
de~and  had exceeded its otlm resources, acted as  an 
intermediary f o r  the growers vrit11 the Caixa de 
Credito Agrfcola. ltJo kinds of credi t  were advanced: 
credi t  t o  cover production costs; and advances on 
actual production, t o  allow the fanners t o  survive 
&he inevitable delay i n  payment i f  'they sold baled 
f i b re  rather than seed cotton,, Fig. 8 shows the 
steep increase i n  credi t  conceded t o  cotton f a m e r s , ~  
-- The IlM acted as a commercial agent f o r  groups of 
s m a l l  cap i ta l i s t  producers, pooling the i r  cotton 
and finding, f o r  a fee, buyers i n  the Porwguese 
port  of Leix"os. 
-- The IMI  classif ied and controlled the quality of 
cotton f ib re  ancl by-products, and generally super- 
vised the export of cotton. 
The ro le  of the State shifted, w i t h  the foundation of tlze IRM, 
Prom mere enforcer t o  active participant i n  production manage- 
ment. The costs incurred were borne largely out of taxes 
on Mozambican cotton exports, out of subsidies from the co- 
lon ia l  budget, and out of  the difference betvreen prices 
paid t o  the peasants and prices paid by the companies. 
lifter Independence: 1975 t o  7980 
S u m m q : :  
- - <.- - I /  - 
Tlie cotton ibdustiy iras particularly !lard h i t ,  by the f l i g h t  
of many of the  Por-ixguese s e t t l e r s  and s t a t e  employees a f t e r  
Independence, &'lost of the f a.mers vho had dominated production 
i n  the early q970s l e f t  i n  the--2 irsk feui years, abandoning 
rnharvested. crops, broken tractors, and unpaid lams. Many 
employees of the If'JT also l e f t  abruptly, often, destroying 
the i r  records before they vent. The private truckers and mer- 
cil,mts,, tjritI2out thorn i n  many areas cotton could not be l~oved 
o r  marketed, also fled,  The development 09 the new collective 
units, s t a t e  farms a d  cooperatives was blocked by management 
problems, w.xr1.cet disorgenization and lack of inputs. Family 
production did actually begin t o  recover i n  1975/76 from the 
lovr point of 1971!+/75, and private production also rose sligirtly 
i n  '1976/77. IIqwever, prodyctiori f e l l  in all, sectors with the 
poort harvest of 1978/79,. .'This c r i s i s  i n   rod-uction obliged 
the ' ginning factories  -to" operate f a r  below, capacity, wit12 
correspondingly I?igl? costs, and Purtlher coapromised the i r  al- 
ready declining prof i tabi l i ty .  Most of these factories  were 
taken over by the State. 
1 / I  
I n  sh0i.t; the Sta te  has been forced, toc ihtemene i n  b r  t o  
nationalise almost a l l  of the cot-ton industry except family 
md cooperative production, because 09 the c r i s i s  of the 
colonial economy, Evearthe family and cooperative sectors 
are I~igliLy depeqdent on tk.e State  Zor e>rtelision, seed, and- 
marlzeting semic'rts, TITUS, al-tlzough the Secretariat f o r  Cotton 
has the monopolistic position to  make a integrated cotton 
plaaning pof;icy, it must indertalre -&is task a t  a time -09 
deep and continding c r i s i s  i n  p r q d u c t i ~ n ~  
. , .  . . ...,.... '. ..:.. ~ ' .  , . .. ... . 
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The private s&dt61-,wa's eriously affecied ,by the 'p'ost-Indepen- 
dence f l i gh t  or" the se t t l e r s ,  Those f a m s  whicli had been con- 
centrated i n  large groups, or  v~Iiic!~ were close to  ginning 
f ~ c t o r i e s  o r  co~unercial centers, were generzlly regrouped i n  
the new State  farm sector, Se t t l e r  farms i n  outlying areas 
were unofficially occupied e i ther  by collective o r  coopera- 
t ive  machanbas, or  by individual fan i l i es  cultivating cotton. 
The scattered blocks of the s t a t e  farms, mainly i n  Nmpula 
Province, were merged f o r  administrative purposes into large 
prod-uction units. This structure of highly centralised 
mmagement combined v~itl? weak or  even absent adrainistration 
i n  the fiel-d, was reflected i n  the technictil choices made f o r  
the s t a t e  sector: no~mcropping of catton and Lhe mechaniza- 
t ion 09 a l l  f i e l d  !tasks except harVesting, . >Tlzis prodwctLon 
pattern l e d  t d  very !?iglx costs VKL-KIOU~ ~orrespondjng increases 
i n  produ~tF'on ,-- calling, fo r  exmple9 f o r  the: spraying of in- 
secticides and defoliants by a i rc ra f t ,  '\!hen neiC12er the  air-  
c r a f t  nor the defol imts  arrived, v~orlrers had t o  be quickly 
recruited %o weed by hand, but were sometimes unable t o  f in i sh  
i n  time or  t o  complete the work fo r  the ~ r l ~ o l e  planted area. 
P'Iiuiagers a t  f i e l d  level  ?rere illadequately trained fo r  the 
teclmiques tha t  were t o  be used: such errors a-S inappropriate 
methods of planting fo r  use with defoliants were cornlion. 
Lastly, since cot-ton picking could not i t s e l f  be mechanised, 
the meckanizatioaa of the other f i e l d  tasks rnegnified the prob- 
l e m  of recruit ing a seasonal labour force f o r  the harvest only, 
The magnitude of the difference i n  the demand f o r  Labour a t  
the two periods can be seen i n  the plm of production below 
(Fig. g ) ,  f o r  the state cotton farms i n  N s u ~ l p u l a ,  by the  Pro- 
vincial  Directorate of Agriculture (DPA): 
FIG-9: Plan f o r  Cotton Prcduction i n  State  Farms, Nampula., 
1977/78. 
Farm Total Area Area Planted Field Labour Estimated -Uo, of 
?EE Jha. ) .. - . . (laa, - - . ) Planned froln Production 
.. . t.'larcll Tor 
- .- " 
becember t o  i n  Tcpnes 
. . - . *  
="es t- l 
1, 00 o r 0  19 80 g 000 
W I1 !%g& 5, 375 l!-, 230 6,200 310,000 
U?IV 2,000 1 9 979 1,500 210, 305,000 1 
Imala I 825 500 550 050 11-2,500 I 
1rna3-a 11 - 275 50 - 250 - 300 - --I 5,000 l 
UP Nuite 550 l!-00 1 i.00 600 30,000 
UP Corrane 2.000 , I. 050 l ,  500 2,100 -?05,000 I 
One worker i s  s~pposedl to  ,pick 20 kg. of seed cotton per day. 
Suc5 an enormous d-ifferevlce between lsrbo~r required fo r  pick- 
ing, and labour %or other tasks, is clearly incompatible with 
s tabi l izat ion of the work force ss a ~-~ecessary basis fo r  
soc ia l i s t  Lransf ornation, In? Naaptlla it also pruvBd techmi - 
cal ly ineff icient ,  Reports speak constantly of delays i n  
spnaying by planes, as  well as  of problems in labour recruit- 
ment f o r  cot-l;on-piclcing, Both kinds of de1e.y lowered prodnc- 
t i v i t y  m d  raised costs disastrously. In  't977/78 the NwrpttLa 
Provincial Directorate of Agriculture reported tha t  the s t a t e  
sector produced only 10,71t!_ tomes of cotton 01- 11,661!. ha,, 
and national averages were even lov~er, In 1978/79, a season 
of bad weather, production i n  Nmpula dropped to  6,797 tonnes. 
Poor productivity was not compensated fo r  by mixed cropping, 
mainly of sunflower and maize, which was practised on only 
about 10 per cent of the cultivated area, Tlae s t a t e  sector 
has not, tlzerefore, provided a dynamic base f o r  t l ae  recovery 
of ea r l i e r  levels  02 productivity i n  anore progressive social  
and technical conditions, 
S i -d lar ly ,  cooperative cotton production has so  f a r  been 
nationally insignificm-t, not even a-ppesrring on t9.1e graph i n  
Fig,S. The actual figures f o r  the l a s t  three seasons have 
been : 
FIG. 10: Cooperative Cotton Production, 1976/77-1978/79 
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There seems t6 have been some offic"ia1 discouragement of cotton 
production by cooperatives i n  Zarih&zia. because of i ts laesvy 
demand f o r  labour, a l th~ugll  cooperative lnellzhers themselves 
-' l~av'e not rejected %he cmp, In Nmpula, i n  fcl.ct9 most coopera- 
t ives  i n  former cotton areas chose t o  contime with cctton, 
v?l?-ether they took over ebandoned f i e ld s  o r  began anew, Sun- 
flovlrer was the second most popular crop, The problems b v e  
been, rather , t?2..at the cooperative movement has developed 
slowly, md tha t  those cooperatives t h a t  have grown cotton 
have performed poorly. These are interrelated -- peasants do 
not volulatarily join cooperatives if prod-uction resul ts  are 
not clearly superior t o  those of the family sector, 
Cotton cqoperatives were generally formed on tbbe l ea s t  accesr 
s ib le  of ttle abandoned %se t t l e r  farms: s t a t e  farms have pr ior i ty  
f o r  the provisioi~ of essential  services. klany caoperatives 
planted l a t e  because t ractors  2nd seed did not arr ive i n  time; 
they did! not receive insecticide; t he i r  cotton FEIS nlarlreted 
l a t e  -or not a-k a l l .  Ilost cooperative members cl~ose t o  ensure 
t he i r  o m  food requirements i n  the family sector before support- 
ing cooperatives i~ ar1 early &xge of formation and vri-tlq ~rrealc- 
st&e support. 
Since Independence, private cap i t a l i s t  farmers and f m i l y  ag- 
r icul ture  have been the principal p rod~~cers  of cotton, despite 
the reduced levels  of output. As cre have seen, a f t e r  the f l i g h t  
of the s e t t l e r s  private cotton production actually began to, 
increase. Family production, on the. other haad, had already 
slm.ped before Independence and begag , S ~ O T ~ T I ~  to  recover .in 
1971;/76. In  1970/79 both sectors dropped again; family agri- 
culture produced i t s  smallest t o t a l  since 1939/1!-0, a mere 
12,517 tomes. 
Although 1978/79 vms a bad year f o r  cotton, the problems c m o t  
be reduced t o  &e effects  of poor ureatIier conditions. Since 
t,lozombiquets cotton strategy does not include an enlarged role  
f o r  private farmers, analysis must focus on f w i l y  prock~ction, 
from ~~11ich t e new ~ o t t o n  cooperatives ,must grow. 
i 
In  the family sector, t he  d i f f i cu l t i es  met by the cooperatives 
i n  obtaining inputs and i n  marketing the crop were magnified. 
S te r i l e  o r  infected seed was distributed i n  some areas; i n  
others, cotton was- grovni but never harvested. Although witll- 
drawal of s t a t e  services t o  family cotton producers had begun 
before Independence, the f l i gh t  of the  colonos heightened i t s  
impact through a general d i s o r g a n i ~ a t i o ~ a l  transport 
and marketing. Tl~ere was, moreover, a shortage of such basic 
consumer items as  cloth, s a l t ,  o i l ,  sugar, and paraffin i n  the 
couptryside. lloney received for  cotton could not a.lvrajrs, there- 
fore, be u ~ e d  to  buy t11e things people needed. The c r i s i s  of  
cotton production i n  the' fawily sector caa be seen, tllerefore, 
t o  be only a par t  of o general c r i s i s  of peasant-produced mar- 
keted surpluses, 
The f l i g h t  of the  s e t t l e r s  and the disorganisation of provin- 
c i a l  services strucl; 72ardes-t a t  cotton rnerketing. !.lost cotton 
companies lzad contracted private truckers o r  s t a t e  transport 
enterprises t o  supplement t he i r  ovm f l e e t s  o f  lo r r i es ,  but 
a f t e r  ,Independence the number of mwkets was reduced, cotton 
was only c ~ l l e c t e d  once from each market, and i n  some areas 
the l o r r i e s  never zrrived. Neither the IJJjl, DINECA (the s t a t e  
a.grictnltma1 mmketing agency v~12ich has since been disbanded), 
nor most private conrpqnies were able to  solve the problem. 
The single esrception, Joao Ferreira dos Santos, was ~ b l e  to  
expand in to  the North tirith i t s  large transport f l ee t ,  beyond 
Its trad-itional zones of  influence. The JFS Group exported 
139 836 tomes of cotton f ib re  i n  1377/78, ?bout 82 per cent 
of t o t a l  prodr~ction, Control of transport gzve the JFS Group 
a v i r tua l  stranglelzold on commercial p ro f i t  Pi co-bton, 
Since Independence private growers have kept the s ight  to  s e l l  
t h e i r  cotton ginned rather than raw2 a privilege also extended 
-to some of the new cooperatives. Delays i n  payment fo r  gimed 
cotton i n i t i a l l y  discouraged some cooperatives, hut i n  I$apula 
a t  l e a s t  a credi t  programme now allotars payraek~t t o  be made be- 
fore the f i na l  sale of -ti?.e cotton, T?.zus th.e sale  of ginned 
(rather  than raw) cotton, under conditions of prompt payment, 
can be used as  auz incentive t o  encour2-ge collective forms of 
production. 
111 1977 the price of f i ~ s t  grade cdtton t o  peasant ppoducers 
rose from 8600 t o  I l@O; second grade rose from 38100 to  1!&0. 
P i t  these prices cotton became inore lucrative than other cash 
crops, both i n  terms o f  ~ e t ~ m  t o  labour and i n  terns of re- 
l a t i ve  price increases since A975. The o11y bet ter  return is 
provided by the rniriiaun agr ic~ l l tu ra l  vrage, recently raised to 
62,50 per day. Clearly, tlien, low productivity i n  the 
f a l i l y  sector cmy~ot be increased simply by cha~ging pricing 
policy. 
Processing : 
The sharp decline i n  pmductioli of seed-cotton d t e r  Indepeii- 
denbe has meant tl~c?t most ginning factories  have been working 
f a r  below ca.pacit;lr, trith very high t m i t  cbsts, Mevem?-tj'3eless, 
only one ginning f a c t o m  a t  X@-Xai i n  Ga-za P~ovince, has 
actually been closed down, The follov~ing table compares pro- 
duction of baled cotton i n  selected- factories  in ?972/73 
i n  1977/78. 
Production of Giplied Cotton by Selected 
Factories, -?9?'2/73 avid 1977/78 
Province v Production ( '000 to~r&isL 
A 9'/2/72 'l9'/7f /ts 
rlontepuez Cabo Delgado 5,779 1,963 
Ptu-hiali Niassa ) ,983 
Nanga SoQala l!-, 983 2, h36 93-l 
Megbza Zmb6zFa 2 , 331:- 899 
Namialo Nampula 7,Olj.I 2, 893 
Despite t he i r  unproPitabili-ty, these fzctories  caiilot be closed 
unless cotton prod~~ct ion  iii a part tcular  zone i s  also brought 
t o  a hal t ,  f o r  Pllozai"abiguefs transport networl.; cannot mve seed- 
cotton over long distances fo r  ginning. Indeed, one of the 
reasons ' for  the present high fixed costs i s  t1ia"c frequent trcms- 
port  delays interrupt the 2rr ival  of cotton a t  the- factories,  
and v~orlrers and mach.inery 11i~zs-t stand i d l e  during -these waiting 
periods, Tlze State  has hsd t o  take over alrizosl; a l l  the ginn- 
ing 'factories,  The single escceptiolz i s  i21e JFS Geba factory 
i n  Nampula, vt?icli i s  included. i n  a prop,osed j o i i ~ t  venture. 
The State' S policy tov~ards the currently unproductive but 
necessary ginning factories  has iizmediate consequences f o r  
other sectors of cotton production. If the ,ginning r a t e  were 
t o  be raised to  re f lec t  current u n i t  casts,  f o r  instance, 
cooperatives vmtild lose the' a.dxra.ntage gained from being able! 
t o  s e l l  t he i r  own ginned cotton, N o t  oiily h.z.ve these costs 
gone up a s t r ~ n o a i c ~ l l y  since Independence, but the ac-4;t1~XL qual- 
i t y  of th6 cotton f ib re  produced has deterioraked (see Table 1 
i n  the STATISTICAL APPENDI:~), thus ~bvrering its price on the 
world maPket, The decline i n  quality is a reflexion of poor 
conditions 0s" production of seed-cotton, c both in terns of- ac- 
tua l  quality and of the grading process, gs we13 as of the in- 
effeciency of the ginning factories,  Either ~~857, i n  f i e l d  or  
factsiry, such a decline of quality presents the State wit11 
f undw~ental management decisions. 
Plarkets f o r  1lozanzbica.n Cotton: 
Despite the f a l l  i n  levels  of cotton-fibre production, sup- 
p l i e s  . to the clornes-tic t e x t i l e  industry have .b'een maintained 
since Independence, In  the  Appendix, Fig, 7 shot*~s the evol-u- 
t ion  of cotton .e~pb.r-ts and internal  &onsmnptioli Prom 1962 
t o  1979. . - 
- . -  " 
- . 
. - 
It i s  o i  course possible tha t  cotton exports were actually 
higher t ha i  indicated by t5e o f f i c i a l  f igwes.  As Table 11;. 
i n  the S t a t i s t i ca l  Appendix S~O'I'JS, the proportion of t o t a l  
production wl~icI7- has renlained utuarketed reached 20 per cent 
i n  7978/79, and lias been high ever since Independence, This 
figure Fr~cludes losses, vreste, and st-ocks held, but. it also 
covers - I l l ega l  exports .- The system of e s ~ o r t i n g  cotton 7ras 
exceedingly co~11ple:r by the encl of %11e colonial period, 
the 1111'1, ginning companies, and groups of producers a11 in- 
volved i n  marketing. ,:eorganizilig this r system and controll- 
ing exports iiavp proved difl"icult, a d  there is evidence that  
unrecorded exporting Iias continued, allowing private companies 
both t o  evade tares  ando more importa.xztly, to  accm~ftate  
foreign e;rchange reserves outside Mozrmbrict_ue. Exporters hgve 
also manipulating the grading system, by classifying their  
cotton as  lovr-grade f o r  export purposes from Mozambique, hut 
as  higlz-grade f o r  sale  a t  higl3-er prices i n  Portugal_. 
li 'th produc-tiviqr a t  i ts present lovr level ,  1C/lozmbique has 
not &ad to  confront problens of market d-iversifica*tion o r  
pricing agreements, In  '?978/73 a l l  the cotton exported froin 
Mozambique vent t o  Portugal, a re t rea t  f~-0111 t l r& broader market 
being reached a t  -i;i?-e end of the cokoniz-l period, The drop i n  
tlae proportion of I-righ-quality cotton produced' since "175 is  
a fwtl ier  potenti3.l cause of market ~realmess (see T3.ble 11 i n  
the Sta.tistica1 i!ppendii:). This problem is expected t o  re- 
'solve i t s e l f  when productivity again reaches fomkr ' leveis .  
f new t ex t i l e  m i l l  !?as already been opened i n  TJampula; and 
others are being bui l t .  111 the future, it i s  c lear  'that tlie 
allocation of optimum proportions of t o t a l  output t o  domestic 
industry on one hand, and export earning on the otlzer, w i l l  
present a much inore important problem to  Mozambique' S economic 
p lmiers .  
State Intervention: 
The fXigt_zt of the Portuguese se t t le rs  :?ad cl devastating effect 
on the IPJI, A t  bot1z national and provincial levels of the 
Inst i tute,  technical personnel fled, either destroying records 
or  taking information with then. Xesearcll programmes were in- 
terrupted; administration was disrupted; Mozan~b$can personnel, 
usually a t  the bottom level, were l e f t  to tlzeir ovni devices. 
In  addition, the departing se t t le rs  often l e f t  unpaid credit  
balances ~ f ~ I t h  the IN4, Lastly, the ZLG1'S act ivi t ies  b d ,  i n  
many provinces, depended on Uae availabili ty of transport 
which was contracted from the ppivate sector, But tl?.at sec- 
t o r  too ca~as decimated by the f l ight .  
As an emergency measure a l l  agricultural ular1zeting and all. 
seed provision was made tlqe responsibility of  a single s ta te  
agency, DIfTECA, using the f ac i l i t i e s  of  the I1-IPri, and of the 
former Institute de C e r i a i ~  ( I c ~ I ) ,  In '1978 Q1;e I45 was re- 
organized and renamed the Xnstituto qacional de efA7-god50 (IEU~), 
and i n  7979 a national secrptariat YTas formed to  oversee and 
plan th? -integrated developfient of $j3ie cottoll sector. PTO- 
vincial ,firms have been foded  i n  tl2q uajor cotton-produ-cing 
areas to  replace the diffuse strwctxkre of ginning conlpanies, 
private f a n ~ ~ s ,  cotton tradeps end peasant producers. Tliey 
are intended botla to  coordilic?.te state-farn development wit11 
ii~rovemeiits i n  family production as i-t i s  transf oraed into 
cooperative production, and t o  l ink the provincial ginning 
and te:ctile industries v n t h  the organiza.tion of a-@-iculbxe . 
The most f undarnental clzange, however, has been the absolute 
rejection of direct or  indirect force as a motor of peasant 
cotton production. Aslaed t o  describe the lowest level cotton 
agents i n  contrast t o  t I ~ e  former ca atazes, peasants tmifornlly 
replied: 'jTh.ey no longer beat us. +r- -\ evert2zebess. the train- 
ing 2lnd inf oma-kion programmes that  are t o  be the * alternative 
t o  force are still largely i n  the pleamine phase: cooperatives, 
supported by s ta te  farms, are Ito be centers f o r  tecluzical in- 
formation, and existing personnel are to be retrained iii ex- 
tension methods aid i n  the grading of cotton. 
Conclusion 
The f ~ . d a ~ e n t 8 1  cIzallenge to  the colonial and c sp i t a l i s t  
s t a t e  tha t  was presented by F;aLII'IO resulted in a deep a d  
continuing c r i s iq  f o r  cotton production. In fac t ,  the tern1 
Listate  intemreiition'~ aq.,z.pplied t o  the coJcton sector is pro- 
bably incorrect. The colonial s t a te ,  despite & a g e s  i n  the 
organization of cspi ta l  and forms 02 exploitation, vras  splv~~ys 
deeply ilivolved i n  control of cotton prod-~~ctian; it ~ra~ 'neve_r  
autside it, I , I  
- 
It i s  also c lear  th.at tl?_eld-eep c r i s i s  o f  colonial fonbs i n  
the organization of cotton production a.t Independence dicl not 
tripe t11e s l a t e  clean, nor 2.190~ the new socia l i s t  Government 
t o  begin anew along progressive l ines.  Instead, tlie old foms  
of production and marketing, although severely disrupted, have 
tended t o  c a l l  fortl:! new versions of old solutions i n  t3.w ab- 
sence of a systematic reorganization of the old pat teras  of 
s t a t e  action, Such a reorganization is  a lengthy process, 
especially since it iiivolves a fvnd~~ment~.l  change i n  the re- 
clations of the s t a t e  to  the peasantry -- who were the major 
producers of co%%oh, eitQer as wage-v~orkers or  as indepen- 
dent cultivators,  i n  colonial times, 
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The PTozambican s t a t e  faces deep end cou~plicaled plvbleas In  
cotton production. It is cxhar, moreover, tl?.at any in i t i a -  
t ives  t o  resolve these problems m ~ . s t ,  sad indeed can only come 
from tlie State, since it con-trols all the principle sectors 
of t?le industry. 3;3at, then, are t21e central, elements of 
P?Tozsmbique's strategy f o r  the trmsforrnation of cotton 
production? 
-- Expmsion of the domestic te::r-t;ile industry as a cen- 
tral element i n  PIozmbiquets general industr ial  stra- 
tegy: raw cotton production can be increased now, 
both -ko earn foreign excliange tfzrot?gh exports and t o  
meet the ftlture needs of an eirpandii~g 7.ocd i iadust~~r,  
-- Opening tp new areas of cultivation, aad 'r~rit~.~clrav~a.l 
f rdm zones w i t h  exhausted s o i l  m d  Xolr output, For 
exarple,' one large project \ , r i l l  open up a broad area 
of CaJso Delgado and JJiassa to  cotton, 
-- Concentfa-tion of a range of different fomns of pro- 
duction around a central  ginning factory and/or tex- 
t i l e  mill. Cotton t r ~ i l l  be grown i n  different collec- 
t i ve  Poms of production--large plaitatbans, caopera- 
tives--aL?ich v ~ i l l  be integrated wit!?. industr ial  
development. I >  
-- Development of a more productive and betterjfntegrated 
system of cotton CV-ltivation in the family sector, 
Improving techniques i n  t t 2 . i ~  sector, f o r  food produc- 
Lion as  u~e l l  as  cotton, w i l l  consti tute 2- f i r s t  step 
towards introducing collective Toms of production. 
The general orientation of -l;lzese elements is cLea.r, but the 
v?ay i n  '~!~.ich the strategy is  to  be rir11pl.enented t<rill, of course, 
depend on the concrete situation. The objective of  -Lhe ~ J O -  
ye3r CL4 project has been t o  present some of  the backgrow-8 
Fnrformation necessary f o r  future cotton plamzing, If we re- 
turn to  the l ist of general problems facing Third 1iosr;ld corn- 
t r i e s  engaged i l l  transforming cotton production (see ClaapteT 
I ) ,  vre can novr consider the part icular  issues raised by 
f4ozanbique's otm progranrile of ,trmsiEioli i i ~  relat ion to  tlzose 
problems. In  each o f  the f ive  areas already identified,  the 
relevant CWL cottoli report i s  ci ted below; i n  Clla-pter I V  we 
go 01-1 to  provide brief summnries of eac3 tex t  i n  response t o  
tile questions raised, 
-- How to  move from 2. bach~ard, seasonal, swd labour 
intensive fomz of production, without incurring f o- 
reign debts ~~dtlich t,~ouilc?. threa.ten Cott0iar s owl? e ~ p o r t  
earnings? Tlie Pbzambican strategy i s  to  articula-be 
s t a t e  farim and cooperatives and t o  concentrate them 
around centers of ind-ustrial development. This i n  
turn raises  some other issues: 'ilotr are the problems 
of seasonal ul~..ge-lzbow i n  the s t a t e  sector t o  be re- 
solved i n  the t ra~ is i t iona l  period? K3ov cam family 
cotton producers be convinced S l a t  cooperative f ori~ls 
produce iuore 2nd better? 1-Iow 8Te -the concentrated 
poles of development -i;o be lildced to  the hilaterland 
arezs so tha t  the vr11ole region develops': , ,.Tkebe ques- 
tioizs are addressed i n  Lieports 79/9, 80f3, 80/Lc, 81/2, 
81/3 and 81/5, 
-- Hour t o  organize P fast,  clzeap marketing system to  l ink  
the producers t o  the ginnilig fac-tonies' The stra- 
tegy 07" gro~zping production uni ts  around an industr ial  
centes provides a longer-term sol t~t ion.  11% the short 
tern, however, -ic!~e issue is l20w t o  reduce iilarketing 
costs md assure supply t o  tfie factories,  without 
tying the s t a t e  into ineff icient  marketing patterns 
anti in to  subsidizing private commercial capi tal ,  
T h i s  problem is addressed by Report 79/9, 
-- How to  obtain favourable terms o f  trade i n  an unstable 
- m d  competitive market, i n  VTIIIC~ 140zaxbican cotton 
plays a m2nor' part? In  the lmig tem11, the e r ~ ~ n s i o n  
of cotton production i n  1'Ioz~li1l~ique ~ L l l  be absorbed 
by the local  t ex t i l e  industry, so the auestion  ill 
lose i t s  importance, In the s'1or-t t e~m,  hov~ever, it 
i s  v i t a l  to  know zidiich kinds of producer-groups or  
long-term buying arrangements w i l l  most f avow Mozm- 
bique, Ti2e''TifIPA report t r i l l  tacld-e this question. 
-- Xlo~r -to orgm~ize  a systeu of researcl? axd ezctensioi? 
i n  co t -ko~ production OL? S. par t~itL?. otI7-er producer 
cotmtries'l' The P'Iozalbican s-trsteg-y 02 art icv2ating 
f o m ~ ~ s  09 produ-ction psovides a  ay of orgs.nizFl?g re- 
search mcl  extension t5 . i :o~~h  tf?.e prod-t'zc-tioi?. units 
t?.aerilseLves, lea-vimg the LIJA -to Gct basic yesearch and 
coordination. Nonetheless, probl-ens rem-in: t.rli-~.t 
choice of tec;?niqt'ze i n  -b.e s-taJze aid cooperative sec- 
t o r s  t r i l l  provide s. ma-teTieL bcsis  2or coll&oration? 
kIow c m  teclmical iiqrovei~elzts i n  the  f a-l i ly sector,  
wf?icL~ are necessary- POT the  recovery 02 ::ig2 l eve l s  
o f  procluctivi-t7y, be 1-idzed -to -U:e deve1opuen-t 02 
collec-bive pBroduc-Lion f orus  .. The qtlestion;f -are a& 
dressed'. i n  reports 80/3 ~ii?d 8?/3,  . 0 -  
L i s t  02 CWb iiegorts on 'Cotton 1 
80/3 11 -transfcrm~acao da agricultxu-e f a n i l i a r  ne Proviiicia 
de FTar~p~d-a, -- I~Iz.pu-to, 1980, v i i i ,  9?p. 
so/!; 0 sec tor  estata1 do dgodao--fp;.ca de "crabelho e 
prod~ttividade : u n  estudo cla WIL lZe;@chQria, -- 
Pie8puto9 980 S 55p. , I  
81/2 Cono mellzorar a s  c u l t w a s  al inentares? -- Naputo, 
1981. In press,  
G1/3 ~omo'  construilp ~ c o o p e r a t i v ~ . ~ ?  -- Ilapu-to 198q 
111 press. 
0 ti7a.b21ila.dor sazonal na transformapao de uma economia 
de ~lantapao -- Weputo 1981,in press .  I / i3Jb ilao batem:' : 8 transformapao da produpgo algodoeirg -- l 
Ilaputo, 1981,,in press. I 
81/6 Circui-Los de trocc. e t r~nspor-be -- Maputo, 1981, in prepa r -  I 
ation. 
81/7 C~pacidade produtive e planificecao nz Te:clo~l. -- 
l:Iapu-to, 1301, In  preparation. 
Tlzis repcr~-.t is concertied vTi-tl~ the problenz of lotr p~-oducti- 
v i ty  i n  the s tc te  sectoq primarily associated uJitIa delays 
caused by difficlklties i n  labour rec-P"Uitme&, Metoch6r.ia- is -. 
a particularly c r i t i ca l  case: it i s  a large farm i n  a. higlily 
productive co tton-producing area 't'112ic7'1 currently has lo~nr yields 
. It Iias to  resort t o  transporting Seasonal labourers 
including a I z i g h  proportion of women ancl children) f r o i n  far- 
off areas, t o  pick the cotton. ,. 
The WO-& shorn that  there are b-ro dis t inct  labour forces 
i n  llIetocfi6ria, !The first is predominantly male, is  stable 
and productive, and i s  employed on a day-wage basis i n  the 
s i sa l  f ie lds  and during the cotton-growing season. Die 
second labour force is  largely composed of and children, 
and has a high turnover ra te  and LOVJ productivity. It i s  
paid piece-rates, namely '1 $50 I'IT per lsg. of cotton picked; 
it is  only employed a t  lzarvest tLme. 'J21ese ttqm labour- 
forces m e  approximately the same size, and largely complement 
each other; the principal cutting period fo r  sisal falls 
a f t e r  the cotton harvest. 
, 
This sharp &Vision i n  the labour force results  from poli t ical  
mechanisms used i n  the 1970s to resolve labour shortages i n  
the eqanding s e t t l e r  sector. Coriq~et~tion TTZS forcing t l ~ e  
wages of regU7.s~ farm ~;rorlcers l~igher, so f ~ ? e  se t t le rs ,  vr110 
needed c1zea.p labour a.t harvest time t o  rnake P profi t ,  tumied 
to  the  sta-i;e t o  recimit them, ~ X S ,  t o  some e::teiit, -the La- 
b o w  probleriis of  f4etoch6ria stem frou t2.e victories a2 Inde- 
pendence; the s ta te  i s  not willing systelnatically t o  crganize 
c l ~ e q  isbow f o r  picking cotton, but has been uisble, as yet, 
t o  ove-mome the probLenlls .involved in a complete i-estirucixwing 
of the labour force. 
In 14etoc21Briz 'c:~ere is stn alternative solutisn, naifiely to 
employ a steble labour force f o r  -&e entire agricultural year, 
paid the rniniuim daily wage, The yeport suggests that  the 
consequent Iraprovemendx i n  trrorker p r ~ ~ ~ z c t i v i t y ,  mcl. t51e elim- 
ination of delays i n  aCcoriplishing tasks, w u l d  yield nmch 
more i n  terns- o f  hig21er cottoi~ output thzn %ze I~ ig l~e r  wage 
b i l l  ~s~otiLd rcin from production profi ts ,  I ,  
i3eyond F'iet0ch6~ia, the cmdysis 02 t h i s  case raises "Ctr~o 11'12- 
p o r t a t  issues 03 cl~oice of tecI-mique, F;ii^s-tlyF %IF! reduction 
of  the cotton iaolmctiLt~re vrotfict f3- l ,a t ta i  -the curve of labour 
req~~iren~eizts, Secolidl-y , p a t t e r n  of rnecl~a?iza.tion wst be 
chosen, not only f o r  thei r  imediate cost efficiency, but also 
for  thei r  effect on the distribution of  demand for  lsbour 
through the a.gric~Q.tura1 year. F1e evidence of 14etoci1619.a 
suggests tlzat, i n  the present pl~a-se, the teclmique that  is  
most profi t ible i n  cast a d  ou-ii3u-k terms, may a l s o  be the 
one v d t f z  tI:e most stabilizing effect on the s t a t e  farm la- 
bour Zorce. 
The trmsfo-mnation of family agriculture i n  N a a ~ u l a  Pravirice 
(Report no. 80/31 
This report snalyses conditions of *.cooperative production - 
i n  Nampula., the nost iraportant cotton-growing province of  . 
P'Iozm-bique. Cotton was a forced crop f o r  both men and tfip-fnen 
there during the colonid period, and i n  the 1960s peasants 
were expelled by se%tlers froin solue of the prime, cottoll 
1 Tlae central question confronted by the study is t h i s :  
lzow c m  peasants be convinced that  {they can produce more, , 
produce better, and produce more profitably i n  cooperatives 
than they could i n  i i ~ d i v i d u ~ l  f aillily fields? O f  course, an 
underlying ques t h n  is . t~heth.ei?,~ s1.d_3;tonnn $s.,an approprizke crop 
for  Cooperatives i n  tl?eka.idtia.l ,tpfia~eeI given its ayj;dd recoP6" tllg -* - ...--. - 
as a forced crop, i t s  heavy labour requirements,' .....-. .. . 
.. - - \ - I fluctuations i n  amuzl yield. 
The Cl% researcliers investigated four cottai+gro~~ing coopera- 
tives, each a t  a different level of  develo~11ielit and vrith a 
different base, 2d.l shared a co~mon dilemma, however: the i r  
productivity per ha.. tic7.s not only lower t2t:la.n tha-% of tlne 
ear l ier  se t t le rs  on the same land, it ~ ~ ~ ~ . s  even lover than 
that  of nearby peasayfts grovYing cotton. Since the cooper* 
tives also had 31igher costs of productFon ( f o r  tractors, in- 
seclicides, fe r t i l i zers )  tlzan the peasants, ,the Pinaicial 
resul ts  were disastrous. The work registers  showed tha t  Low 
participation during c r i t i c a l  periods Faas a t  l ea s t  pa r t i a l ly  
responsible f o r  the poor economic performance. In  the older 
cooperatives, moreover, participation had fa l l en  off over time. 
1\40st peasant families simply cannot afford t o  work i n  coopera- 
t ives  -- poor economic resul ts  meet the  natural response of 
low participation, and the giving of p r io r i ty  t o  family pro- 
duction, Ijow, then, is t h i s  circular  problem t o  be resolved3 
The report ident i f ies  two weaknesses of cent- cooperative 
planning i n  Nampula, which must be corrected, Firs t ly ,  co- 
operative members were not generally tlaernselves responsible 
f o r  t h e i r  own production plans. Plans, often based on high 
fixed costs, were imposed from above. They were neither 
understood nor agreed t o  by the members who had, uTtimately, 
t o  do the actual ~ v d ~ k  la.id out by the plan, Secondly, co- 
operative members could not plan accurately, because essen- 
t i a l  services contracted by the s t a t e  (tractorg, seed, mar- 
keting) could not be re l ied  upon. .I . 
The CEA investigation concludes tha t  the treakness of the 
cooperatives could not be at t r ibuted t o  cotton growing a6 ;. 
) . 
such. Peasants .in coopera-tives -ciwse-. ta g r o ~ - c ~ - t t ~ E t - ~  - -ev= l. v-b--;- 
though it had been a forced crop, and they hoped to- equal - - 
the se t t l e r s '  resul ts ,  Peasant f m i l i e s  must have some * 
cash income, and i n  Nampula cotton is seen as a dependable 
source f o r  tha t  income, -The question reaaihs, whether the 
s t a t e  structures fo r  cotton and fo r  cooperatives can respond 
t o  the needs of the growing movement, by providing re l iable  
marketing, regular inputs, and the extension trainzng tha t  
w i l l  enable cooperative members t o  plan fo r  themselves. 
This sub-project was conceived i n  d i rec t  response t o  the 
findings of the Nampula research, The character and organi- 
zation of s t a t e  assistance is  crucial  t o - t h e  economic suc- 
cess of the cooperatives znd'of cotton prodyetion, But the 
s ta te ' s  resources are limited, a d  are dram upon i n  each 
region by other sectors, other types of produc-t;ion, The pm- 
pose of the research i n  Lugela wa.s, therefore,  t o  agproach 
the problem of planning, no$ within the coopePatives as such, 
but i n  the context of the organizational patterms and ,levels 
of investment needed f o r  t he i r  development, given the pri- 
o r i t i e s  of the region, 
The -d i s t r i c t  of Lugela i n  Zambezia Province has good cotton- 
growing potential  over one half of i t s  area. In  colonial 
times cotton cultivation was obligatoryffor wornan, Men were 
recruited f o r  the t ea  and combined cottonfslsal  plantations 
both wikhin and outside Lugela, Cassava became the primary 
subsistence crop, and also, with the secure market of the 
plantations, developed a strong commercial role  as  a comple- 
ment t o  cotton, By Independence family agriculture consisted 
of a large number of women carefully tending and conserving 
small p lo ts  which produced l i t t l e  surplus. In  only a few 
isolated areas did men leave plantation labour i n  the 1960s 
t o  became major producers of the cash crops cotton, maize 
and cassava. 
The two central  economic tasks i n  the transformation of family 
agriculture in) Lugela are,  therefore, t o  s tabi l ize '  the plan- 
ta t ion  workforce, and hence the peasant base; and to  concen- 
t r a t e  the scattered but well-tended parcels of land into 
more productive cooperative units. But t h i s  transfomation 
has been hampered by Lugela's marginal position re la t ive  t o  
other areas of the Province, The population i s  scattered, 
and the infrastructure of transport and commerce, associated 
with the development of the plantations, i s  very weak. A t  
Independence there were some machambas colectivas i n  the 
d i s t r i c t ,  but a t  present there are no strong, consolidated 
cooperatives; even the first new pol'i'cicaT administration 
was only ins ta l led  i n  1979, 
Clearly, planners i f i  such a d i s t r i c t  must take investment de- 
cisions i n  terms of theirzelalionship t o  overall regional de- 
velopment, part icular ly the major poles of developm&nt, In 
Lugela, a new industr ial  t e x t i l e  complex is planned fo r  
Mocuba and the plantations. Each of the Lugela reports con- 
siders one par t  o f  t h i s  problem, and each one tr,eats aspects 
of the reorganization of cotton production. This  i s  pre- 
c ise ly  because cotton has been,'and wi l l  continue to  be, cen- 
tral to  the development potential  of LugeLa., Although each 
report deals with the specific s i tuat ion i n  the d i s t r i c t ,  the 
ser ies  is organized so as  t o  be, we hope, useful i n  the 
analysis of planning problems i n  other loc&it ies ,  
'How * . ,  are coope~r~tJ ,v~s  - . .. X builC , .. (Report . * . . . . . .  no, 8?/3), 
This report argues tha t  cooperatives must choose crops i n  the 
awareness tha t  tlzey are primarily uni ts  tha t  produce marketed 
surpluses fo r  sale ,  Hence the avai labi l i ty  and security of 
markets and of transport count as much aB so i l  quality and 
ra in fa l l  levels. Cotton is  an appropriate crop in~ the l low-  
land areas of Lugela because there is, transport fo r  rapid 
marketing. If certain roads were repaired, -the network could 
be expanded. A t  the level  of production, t3-e mast important 
task is  t o  improve output and quality i n  the family f ields.  
In tlais task too, centralization i n  cooperatives of technical 
training, of experimentation, and of the system of providing 
inputs, woUld give d is t inc t  bdvmtages to  cotton as  a crop. 
To real ize these advantages i n  cooperatives, however, EPAZ 
(the provincial cotton enterprise) arid the I N A  must organize 
marketing and extension much more precisely and coherently. 
I I 
EPTlle~.. doe-  _beat us _ q p p r e  : the transformation of cotto,n 
. . * . ..--m . . * - m .  " . . - .  productibq8 -( Report no2. - 81 . /5j-- . ,. 
The requirements f o r  cotton produc-tion i n  the regional econo- 
my are examined i n  t h i s  report, which concludes tha t  produc- 
.tion i n  d i s t r i c t s  l i k e  Lugela must recuperate. The central  
problerul i n  Lugela is tha t  cotton must be made into a crop 
which can compete-) favourably -v\r_ith the  marketing of cassava 
i n  thel blest cotton zones, and with wage-labour i n  the planta- 
tions, The report examines specific local  techmical problems, 
and proposes the development of extension and experimentation 
through cooperatives. Jlthough marketing and the provision 
of inputs could presumably be organized through EPAZ, the re- 
port  argues tha t  it is  necessary f i r s t  t o  improve the corner- 
c i a l  network i n  general, before expanding catton production; 
the peasants cannot ea t  money, 
-. 
",Hqvl.xg food p-ro-duction ... . . -  be improved?" .. .-C. . (&port- no. 8) f 2) 
Two central  n ~ ~ t r i t i o n a l  problems of Lugela are addressed i n  
t h i s  report. The peasantry, f i r s t l y ,  depends heavily on cas- 
sava, . both as  a vegetable. and as  t he i r  principle s taple food; 
there are d i f f ic~lLt ies ,  secondly, i n  feeding vmrkers on the 
plantations. The two problems are interconnected; both are 
the resu l t  of the forms of colonial exploitation i n  t h i s  &S- 
t r i c t .  Forced labour fo r  men i n  the plantations opened new 
markets f o r  cassava; the ments absence, together with forced 
cotton cultivation f o r  women, turned producers t o  cassava f o r  
security, and because of the even distribution of labour re- 
quired to  cultivate it, 
The report concluded tha t  cassava cultivation should not be 
discouraged. Zatheri ' food-crop production 8houLd be restored 
and ratronalized within LugeLa, with cooperatives i n  areas 
next t o  plantations producing food-surpluses t o  s e l l  ,to them. 
Secondly, experimentation and extension work must be done, i n  
new rotations of varied food-crops, which w i l l  be introduced 
through cooperatives i n  cotton-growing areas. - 
P"l%e seasonaJ-*.wo_~.ker i n  the- t.ransfomnation . . -  . .. of a plantation . v 
'econom~*'~f~<eport .- no.. , @ - c /  L!;) ' . - d - -  
This report looks 'at  the s-tructwe of the market f o r  semi- 
sk i l led  agricultural  day labourers i n  the sfsal/cotton- and 
t ea  plantations' of Lugela, The crop pattern a d  the scale of 
production are such tha t  there could be up t o  4,000 permanent 
jobs, with a supplementary demand f o r  an extra 2,000 workers 
durfng'the tea harvest, which occurs a t  the same time as  cot- 
ton weeding, 'Workers were originally recruited by force; 
a f te r  %he abolition of the forced labour contract system, i n  
the  1 9 6 0 ~ ~  wages rose rapidly, part icular ly i n  relat ion t o  
cotton and other cash crop prices,  Present-day wage levels  
are  even more f avowable, although work conditionw and poor 
transport have kept recruitment levels  on tlie plantations low. 
A t  present plantation workers are  recruited from a l l  over the 
d i s t r i c t .  The re la t ive  s tabi l izat ion of the plantation work 
force, and the development of forms of cotton production which 
secure a higher aind more regular income f o r  cultivators,  are  
a necessary basis fo r  the fulfilrnen-t 03,Lugelats Lea and cot- 
ton potential.  
PPfJIarketing and transport i n  rura l  developmentff (Report no, 
81/6), 
- r  
I 
The present s t ruc t~we of commerce and transport is elcamined 
i n  t h i s  report, i n  order t o  discover how reorganizsttion 
might solve some of Lugela's most pressing problems, These 
include the food shortage on the plantations, poor marketing 
i n  the family sector, and the blocking of cooperative develop- 
ment. Road repair and the organization o f  transport are em- 
hasized, since there i s  no shortage of private merchants 
looking f o r  profitable outlets;  it i s  rather the marketing 
conditions which prevent them making tha t  prof i t .  
Marketing cotton is  relat ively simple. Lorries must get i n  
and out during a single period only, during the dry season 
when themads are most passable. Cotton does not need 
permanent commercial f ac i l i t i e s ,  Nevertheless, the edqansion 
of cotton production depends on a general improvement i n  the 
structure of marketing i n  Lugela, to  ensure tha t  commodities 
a re  available, and hence tha t  comercial  production v a i l l  re- 
main al fundamental characterist ic of both the family and 
cooperative sectors. 
The.ginning of cotton i n  Narapula Province (Report no, 79/9)  
This report exmines the divergent 'fortunes of three differ- 
ent types of marketing a.nd ginning compaiiy, fac@d w i t h .  the 
c r i s i s  of the colonial economy, The f i r s t  of the comganies 
was CADAN, a ginning factory linked to  a s e t t l e r  marketing 
cooperative which went b d r u p t  soon a f t e r  the Portuguese 
Tl-ed, The second was CAM, a chain of ginning factories  and 
some plantations, operating throughout the north, whose pro- 
f i t  volume was severely cut by the f a l l  i n  productivity, 
This made the uni t  costs of ginning too high. Prof i tabi l i ty  
was also h i t  by the increase i n  prices paid t o  the producers; 
these factors led  eventually t o  s t a t e  intervention. The 
th i rd  company was the JFS Group, m aggregate of northern 
tagro-industrial and comercial  interests ,  Although JFS had 
only one factory i n  Nampula, it was able t o  maintain pro- 
f i t ab%l i ty  and edxpand i t s  share of cotton marketing during 
the c r i s i s  by deploying i ts  large f l e e t  of lo r r i es ,  
,'The, three companies were investigated i n  order t o  define the 
!%erns within~which tlie INA and provincial f i r m s  must re- 
organize marketing and ginning. The most important areas 
a-re the f 01-lotving : 
-- The ,organization and ownersl2ip of the transport f l ee t .  
JFS was z151e to  mobilize &S f l e e t  f o r  cotton market- 
ing precisely because it is  commercially active the 
year romd. A transport system for  cotton marketing 
does not require a special f l e e t ;  rather, it should 
depend on cooperation between s t a t e  marketing agencies. 
-- The favouring of collective f o m s  of production 
through the distribution of commercial prof i t .  Pos- 
s ib le  mechanisllzs t o  t h i s  end might be the formation 
of m'arketing cooperatives, o r  a different ial  system 
of  rateG fo r '  ginnlng which would favour production 
cooperatives. 
-- The se t t ing  of ginning rates ,  The report suggests 
. tha t ,  since the present high ra tes  are primarily 
caused by the production c r i s i s ,  any decision about 
them should allow for  future recuperation of output, 
-- Relations between s t a t e  and private capi tal  i n  corn- 
mercial ven.i;ures, - Here too the report argues tha t  the 
present advantages of relying on private capi tal  f o r  
marketing are related t o  the marketing and transport 
c r i s i s ,  It is important, therefore, not. t o  bind the 
s t a t e  t o  present-day forms of cooperation through .- - 
long-term agreements, 
Each d f  these reports analyzes the post-Independence d i f f i -  
cu l t i es  of the t ex t i l e  and clothing industry i n  attempting 
t o  improve the supply of cheap wage-goods. , Such [an improve- 
ment i s  a fundamental. element i n  Nozambiquefs strengthening 
of the worker-peasant alliance. j 
qqPrivate capi tal ,  productivity and participation: a study of 
the Te;umoque factorygq (Report no. %0/2)  
The operation of a new t e x t i l e  factory i n  M q d a  was the sub- 
ject  of t h i s  report. Although it is owned and aperated by 
private capi tal ,  i-t: is  presently funded almost entirely by 
s t a t e  bank credit.  The researchers ident if ied.certain powers 
and mechanisms of cqntrol needed by the s ta te ,  i f  it is t o  
push private capi tal  into a dynamic ro le  i n  a mixed economy. 
Texmoque i s  spared competitive pressures because Nozarnbique 
has few t e x t i l e  producers, md currently demand is high and 
supply has decreased. Prices are s e t  t o  ensure prof i tabi l i ty ,  
but there is l i t t l e  pressure t o  increase productivity. The 
f i r m $  S management, i n  fac t ,  was unable t o  provide in-formation 
on production cosrts, which would serve as  the basis fo r  fu- 
ture  planning, . 
-, 8 
Low productivity could not be attributed t o  an inexperienced 
work-force, Te,moque had excerienced hands, some of them 
recruited from other t e x t i l e  factories.  Selations between 
workers and management, however, were very poor. Complaints 
about , i l l e g a l  qnd unfair  salary scales, incompetent adminis- 
t rat ion,  and managerneat compromising po l i t i c a l  structures 
were common. Such issues are,  of course, linked to  the ques- 
t ion  of s t a t e  control i n  the private sector. 
71Productive capacity and planning in  TexLonzegP 
(Fieport no. 81/7) 
Fo l lo~~ ing  the research a t  Temoque, the-Gmfs  industr ial  
sub-project turned i ts  attention to  T'WY~OD, an older cotton 
m i l l  i n  14aputo. The factory is run by the s ta te ,  and i n  
contrast t o  Temoque, has a well-structured management and 
active worker organization,, Nonetheless, Te:rlom- t q o  has- . 
producti-Vity'" probXeilii3; o ~ t j $ . ~ t  declined4 sharply* @f t e r  
.. . .. 
- 
Independent e . 
I 
The primary cause of, low output is the inadequacy of plann- 
ing procedures, v~hjch, lead t o  production stoppages owing t o  
shortages of nater ials ,  poor machine maintenan~e,~ and- lack 
of spare parts.  Since these problems center around imported 
items, P/Iozambiquets foreign exchange c r i s i s  a f t e r  1979 has 
made things much worse; r a w  cotton, on the other h a d ,  has 
been regularly supplied , t o  the factory. Even so, as  early 
a s  1976 there was evidence of poor coordination of factory 
and of sectoral  planning, and of bureaucratic blockage. 
Coordinated planning ~~ou2.d seem to  be the main issue, but 
there i s  also considerable room fo r  improvedplarming a t  
the Level of the factpry i t s e l f .  Such improvement could be 
achieved, through greater worker participa-tion i n  everyday 
supervision of production f igwes,  inventory, etc,  This 
would pre-suppose the  technical orientation of l i te racy pro- 
g r m e s ,  and the transformation of planning i t s e l f  from a 
seasonal t o  a daily ac t iv i ty ,  
'iWages, productivity snd participation: a study of three 
clothing f actoriestq ( ~ e p o r t  no. 79/8)  
This sub-pro ject  deal t  with the problem involved i n  turning 
a small t e x t i l e  industry producing high-quality clothing on 
a quasi-artisanal basis, into a sector producing cheap clothes 
i n  -quantity. Special attention was paid t o  industr ial  re- 
la t ions  within the factories,  
The nmber of stoppages at t r ibuted to shortages of suyh i m -  
ports as  zips, buttons, o r  machine-parts make it diff  xcult 
t o  look a t  aspects such a s  intensi ty of labour. O f  course, 
stoppages i n  themselves dma-ge worker discipline. Given 
these conditions, bonus-systems are largely ineffective i n  
getting worlcers t o  ra i se  productivity. More worker part ici-  
pation i n  planning might work bet ter .  By overseeing stocks, 
maintaining the machines, and suggesting alternatives t o  
materials i n  short supply, workers can gain the knowledge 
of the labour process necessary if they are t o  contribute 
t o  reducing work stoppages, 
Mozambiquets position i n  the international cotton market 
l MIXA Repore) -.._.-_ .  . I 
- .  . . _ "  
This report w i l l  col late  work done by the ~ o r w e ~ i a n  I s t i -  
t u t e  of International Affairs (NIIA) on three d is t inc t  top- 
ics .  ' These are, an overview of world cotton consumption and 
trade, and of changes i n ' t h e  world division of labour i n  
cotton production; an analysis of the-international cotto? 
trade; and an analysis of the cotton terms of the UNCTAR 
and Lom6 agreements. 
- .  
.- . 
' I  , I  . 
A NOTE ON SOtrrzCES,FOR THE CEA. COTTON PROJECT 
A. bibliogpa-phy l i s t i n g  the principle published sources and 
government documents consulted during the Project w i l l  be 
published separately. Toe C M  has also re l ied  OM, ~unpub- 
l ished reports, the analysis of financial. accounts, s t a t i s -  
t i c a l  material, and various ora l  testimonies collected on 
the f i e l d  t r i p s  t o  Zambgzia and Nmpula and a t  the INA 
i n  Mapu'co. 
For the period 1936-1961 the Pro jec-b used N,S. Bravo (1964), 
who deals with nortlaern Mozambique up to. 1962, but also in- 
cludes some general information on colonial cotton produc- 
t ion, Otler useful sources included Mapril- Gouveia (1968), 
Quintelha- cj95L~) 9.A the. publiqat.io@ of the JEA (1951 and- 
1953), akd production and marketing data drawn from the  
Mozambican Estat is t icas  Agricolas. This data was interpreted 
i n  the l i g h t  of- consultation of local  archives and of inter- 
views with peasants, cotton agents, and the s ta f f  of the INA. 
The principle sources fo r  the period 1962-1974 were the 
IAMI S annual 13elatbrios ( 4 962- 1975) and various unpublished 
reports consuited i n  m e  f i e l d  a t  provincial or  d i s t r i c t  . 
lebel ,  Cotton legislation, CAD AM^> company reports, and 
other compeny records were part icular ly useful, The 
~ s t ~ t i s t i c a s  A~rfco las  stop i n  1967, making data on crops 
other than cotton, a t  the d i s t r i c t  level ,  , d i f f i cu l t  t o  
locate fo r  t h i s  period. 
After Independence published sources are especially scarce, 
and quantitst ive data are often contradictory. The CEn used 
the records of CAM Texmoque, Texlorn, and most importantly, 
the I A M  ( l a t e r  I N A ~  . A t  the provincial level  the CM1 s re- 
searchers used reports and raw data from INA and direct ly from 
Provincial Directorates of Agriculture, The information was 
supplemented and enriched by suweys and by interviews with 
producers merchants and local  administrators. 
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Tlhe aim of t h i s  cornmental-- i s  i10t t o  repeat the analysis 
made igx~,t&q,ealrLier sections but merely t o  point to  certain 
b&ic trends indicated by the s t a t i s t i c a l  tables v~hich 
........ 
* f o l l m .  
'~roductioi? or" 'Seed ' ~ b t t o n  ' 
Tables '1-6 refer  t o  the production of seed cotton, i n  '-e;otal, 
by quality, by forms of production and by Provinces. One 
thing . that  is ime&..ately evident i n  each of these tables  i s  
tlne c r i s i s  i n  -production a f t e r  hdependence. Table ? shows 
tha t  the t o t a l  production of seed cotton i n  the 1978/9 cam- 
paign (the l a s t  year fo r  which figures were available) was 
the lowest recorded since 1939/1!9. Put another way, the o u b  
put i n  19Q8/9 was l e s s  t ~ a m  2154 of the highest production re- 
corded during the colonial period (the 11&..000 tomes  pro- 
duced i n  1972/3) - L3en i n  the rbestt year of the post- 
Independence period, 1977/8, the level  of output was roughly 
on a par with the levels  of the 19~.Os and about half th.e out- 
put of 4972/3, 
Table 2 shovrs production by Eoms of production. The table 
shows clearly tha t  there i s  a f a l l  i n  output from the family 
sector during the 1960s a d  1970s (prior  t o  independence) and 
a grotst11 i n  output during tlae same period from the s e t t l e r  
cap i t a l i s t  sector, -4fter Independence, however, there is  an 
interest ing reversal of the previous trend as  the family sec- 
t o r  comes to  account f o r  rouglily half of the t o t a l  output. 
'This is not due t o  any eryansion of output i n  tl13.s sector, 
On the contrary the output of -this sector f a l l s  i n  absolute 
terns. !Lather, the increasing re la t ive  importance of the 
family sector i s  due t o  t5e disproportionally large f a l l  i n  
output from the 'privado' sector, thus showing the effects  
of the f l i g h t  of 'colonost and the c r i s i s  of the colonial 
economy. PPI3so important i n  Table 2 is the performance of the 
1 -  
new forms of production -- s t a t e  fanas and cooper~tives -- 
vl~liiclx developed a f t e r  Independence. By 1978/9 s t a t e  f ams  
accounted f o r  a relat ively large share of m a lbe i t  auc1-1 re- 
duced to t a l  ou-tppt, This ref lec ts  the take-over o f  a number 
of abandoned privately-owned farms and the i r  transfomation 
in to  s t a t e  famus, Iiowever, it i s  clear  t31at t h i s  sector too 
bras affected by the acute production c r i s i s  of q978/9* The 
ou-but of the sector i n  t ha t  year vms well below tha t  of the 
previous tax-rzpaign. Finally, Table 2 shovrs t h a t  coope~ative 
production ]?as, as yet, not esta-blished a signif icant bridge- 
head ill  the cotton sector, The t o t a l  production of the co- 
operative sector remains t iny both i n  absolpte terns and as  
a '  percentage of t o t a l  output. 
Tables 3 md 1: slxow the provincial brea,&do~m by sectors fo r  
the 1960s and 1 9 7 0 ~ ~  The dominance of 8ampula Province 
thxoughout is shown clearly and i n  f ac t  it can @e seen tha t  
w i t h  declining production i n  the post-Independence period, 
ITamptilafs re la t ive  importance has increa.sed, O f  'tlie other 
provinces the decline i n  production i n  Ca.bo Delgado c7nd 
ZambQzia are noticeable as  i s  the v i r tua l  disappearance of 
cotton prod~~ctiolz i n  Tete and the tlxree southern Provinces, 
Tables 5 and 6 are mainly of h is tor ica l  interesf ,  They show 
tha t  -tlzere was a general iqroveinent i n  quality (a  r i s e  i n  
the proportion of  f i r s t  grade cotton produced) from the early 
q960s onvmrds. This i s  observable boti-1 i n  the family and 
tprivadol sectors, but it is particuLarly noticeable i n  the . 
case of the l a t t e r  u~l~ich w3-S procttacing, on the avera e, lower 
qualit-J cotton than the peasmt sector during the 19 2 OS, 
These figures suggest a) tha t  Institute de Algod~ois 
s t r a t e , ~  v~a-S to  favour hig1;ller qua-lity production tl~rougl:! pro- 
viding various extension aid tech.nica1 services; b) -that al- 
though. these were provided to  boUz sectors, the main e f fo r t  
was concentrated on the s e t t l e r  (privado) sector, This is 
c lea r  fropi the dramatic r i s e  i n  output and ual i ty  u ~ i t l ~ i n  o e 
year of the establis1men-t of the Ins t i tu te  ? see figures f o r  
1962/3 and 1963/!!-) 2nd the steady r i s e  both i n  output and 
quality i n  the years thereafter.  
Finally, reference to  Table l shows tha t  tde quality of the 
seed cot-ton produced seems t o  have been maintained i n  the os t -  
Independence period. despite fa l l ing  output. Only i n  1977/5 
is there any indication of a possible f a l l  i n  quality, . . - - 
This was probably t22.e resu l t  of  the inab i l i ty  of the s t a t e  
s t ruc twes  t o  provide insecticides , pesticides and ,otlier in- 
puts due to the foreign exchange c r i s i s  b111ich began i n  1978. 
Areas under cultivation 
Tables 7 and 8 sho~? the ntu-abers of hectares cultivated by 
foms of production, Although incomplete, Table 7 shows that  
the trends i n  production discussed above were also reflected 
i n  the areas cultivated. There has been a sharp drop i n  the 
number of hectares under cultivation -- the tota.1 area culti-  
vated by p e a s a t  producers i n  1978/3 being ?U6 of that  of 
1966/7, Similarly the area cultivated by tprivados and ma- 
chambas estatais  combined i n  1978/9 was only 7% of the area 
cultivated by rcolonosr i n  1966/?. Finefly, the area under 
cooperative cu t iva t ion  i n  19?8/9 was ofly 1.2% of t1ze to ta l  
area cultivated, 
Table 8 again shov~s the doninance of Mampula Proviace. Of 
the 68.42'1 hectares cultivated i n  1978/9 no l e s s  than 1!-0.206 
or 5996 were i n  Nampula Province. 
Prices .Paid 
Table 9 shovfs the prioes.paid for  seed cotton sold direct t o  
the ginning companies mainly by peasant producers, The most 
striking feature of the Table i s  the low level of prices paid 
over long periods of time. B e n  af ter  the form1 abolition 
of- forced cotton cultivation i n  the early 1960s prices 
scarcely rose above those paid in  the 1950s, Only i n  19'73 
with the onset of  the c r i s i s  of colonia~ism due -to the advanc- 
ing liberation struggle is there a sigx~ificant r i se  i n  prices 
as Were is again a f te r  Independence. The present price 04: 
1 l ,  00 lYT per' quilo for  first grade cotton and 4, 50 f.TT for  
aecond grade cotton u r n s  established i n  1977, 
Ginneb Cotton 
Tables 10-1 2 refer  t o  ' the production of ginned cotton, In 
terns of to ta l  output the production trends fo r  gimed cot- 
ton are similar t o  t l~ose for  seed cotton, Thus, the output 
i n  197819 was approximately 25h of that  of the highest year 
before Independence, 1972/3, v ~ I ~ i l s t  that  i n  the tbestt  yew 
of the post-Independence period was s1igl1KI.y l e s s  than ha.1-f 
tha t  of 1972/3. The s l igh t  differences i n  levels  of output 
f o r  seed and gimed cotton r e ~ k e c t  he fac t  tha t  ginning 
operations continue across seasons, tha t  is, some of the seed 
cotton grown i n  one year Is ginned i n  the next, In  terns of 
p z l i t y ,  hob~ever, the posit ionz i n  the post-Independence period 
f o r  seed and ginned cotton diver#es appreciablye !&ereas the 
quality of seed cotton, measured in'temns of  the  proportion 
of F i r s t  grade cotton produced seen?, broadly speaking, t o  
have been maintained, t h i s  does not appear to  be. the case for  
gimed cotton. Table 11 shows a naticeable f a l l  i n  the pro- 
portion of Liigher grade f ibres ,  Types: &rt:rq, I and I1 
a f t&  'i97&/5. 
I I 
Destinat$on of Raw Cotton , 
1 
,- 
Tables 13-17 deal ~ r i t 1 1  different aspects of  ,the destination 
of the raw cotton produced. Table 13 sho'~z~s 'tlie cjlivision o f  
t o t a l  production beb~een the l o c d  t e x t i l e  industmj and export, 
Tlze most s t r iking point t o  emerge from t h i s  Table is tha t  the 
local  t e x t i l e  industry has been given !priority thrauglhout the 
post-Independence period a t  l e a s t  as  far as the q-uality of 
cotton allocated t o  it is concerned, Tlius, i t  can be seen 
tha t  the quantity consumed by local  industry has been no 
lower than, and i n  many cases sornev~l~a-t ?~ig!;?er than, the 
quantity consumed d ~ i i i g  %he coloi?ial period. In  terrqs of 
qualibj too, Table 15 shows tha t  a large par t  of -Ue higher 
grade ginned cotton has gone to  local  industry vri t lz  the pos- 
s ib l e  exception of the l a s t  -h.~~o years 1377/8 and 1978/9. 
I n  these years tl7.e absolute qumti-bj and the percentages of 
the higher supplied t o  local  industry, seen1 to  have 
fallen.  This accounts f o r  the complaints made by some of the 
t e x t i l e  enterprises, f o r  exmple, Texlolii, tha t  they were 
'starvedt of higher grade cotton aver t h i s  period, althoug1i 
we were talc! by the Cottoll Ins t i tu te  tha t  the procedures f o r  
allocating cotton had now changed i n  a. way which v~ould bene - 
f i t  local  industry, 
l1 The preference given t o  local  industry, i n  terms of quantity 
i f  not also i n  terms of q ~ ~ a l i t y ,  means tha t  export earnings 
from cotton have declined more sl~arply than the decline i n  
cotton production. Ws emerges froin a comparison between 
Ta-bles 13 and 10, T~IUS, whereas Ta-ble 10 shows a decline i n  
l 
l 
production of gimed cotton t o  approximately 25% of the 1972/3 
level  i n  l978/9, Table ?3 sho-trs tha t  t;:e quantity eirported i n  
1978/9 was only 11% of tha t  eqo r t ed  iA 1972/3. 
, . 
Another factor  affecting e ~ y o r t  earnings emerges f r o m  a study 
of Table ll!., C a l m  C, T o t I ~ e r s f ,  is a. residual colwnn repre- 
senting the difference bebreen the quantity of ginned cotton 
produced and tha t  exported and assigned t o  local  industry, 
The large figure fo r  1973/4 under t h i s  c o l m  was explained 
i n  the 1,A.M. Report as  the resu l t  of a decision t o  stock- 
p i l e  because of a Pelatively low vmrld price f o r  cotton, 
S-Iowever, the Izigh figures fo r  the post-independence period 
cannot be explained i n  t h i s  way, On the contrary, they worzld 
appear t o  represent an i l l e g a l  e-xport, equal i n  1978/9 t o  
more than 20% of the t o t a l  prod-uction of gimed cotton, which 
represents a considerable loss  of foreign exchm-ge earnings, . , 
. . . 
%.TO further factors, relevant both t o  the question of pos- 
s ib le  i l l e g a l  e q o r t s  and t o  the question of export earnings 
from cotton production i n  general, are highliglated i n  Tables 
16 m d  17. In    able 16 -it can be seen tha t  a l l  exports i n  
the l a s t  -two years f o r  v~hicla figures are available have been , 
t o  Portugal. The sales  on o-ther markets, vrliich -took place . 
on a limited scale i n  the ea r l i e r  years, appear t o  take place 
no longer, In  Table 47 It can be seen tha t  a large number 
of privately owned concerns vritl~ associates i n  Portugal still 
dominated the  cotton export trade In 1978/9, Together, these 
two factors  v~orzld suggest, f i r s t l y ,  tha t  Tloz.smbique has pro- 
bably been receiving l e s s  f o r  i ts  cotton exports t7 am it 
could i f  it had the capacity t o  s e l l  on other m~rkets ,  and, 
secondly, tha t  m a n y  'loopholest fo r  i l l e g a l  ex'porting and 
mdeP-grading probably still  exis t  ,' 
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Fig.5 - S B a  COTTON E m B T S  SEW COTTOM 
F'ig 6 r Credit Ad-vances 
N O  
Credits 
Year C u l t i ~ ~ ~ t o r s  used (000 eso-) 
* 1970 also includes repaymen-ts from the Cairn de Credilo Agrfcola, 
7971 a l s o  i l~c l t~des  repayments from the Caixa de CrCSdito Agrfcola, Banks 
ad oomercial  ins t i lu l ions ,  
a d 3  r - - ~ d d - b d  , A  I A  ' 2 3  
0-3 W P N W ~ ~ N N O ~ O Q ~ 4 0 ~ 0 0 ~ 4 ~ c n Q " o ~ ~  W P P  
~ ~ w ~ ~ m ~ c n e n o r n o ~ r n ~ r n r n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ u n  w-raoe$R88f:m,bm8t$< b ,, a S *  r. .. c. .. a -  - - m  - w - - + * r . . . r - -  L...s.c .gr... . u s  M '  9 .  r *  U .  r-  8 .  r. 9 . e -  r -  r -  a*.. (J 
m o a a  tjrj;, 0 d. $ B 3 8 ~ d ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ , " , f ; ~ ~ g f ~ m b ~ o o d @ 8 ~ a ~ ~ s 8 ~ m  P ~ - r , b > i > D d  3 U b h 0 c 7 r J 4  Q L .CD 
9 S 
U W ~ ~ O U ~ ~ ~ ~ C ~ O ~ ~ C O U C ~ U C ~ O C ~ ~ ~  ~ ~ ~ Q O O D ~ G ~ ~ ~ O G > ~ . J : , D  n P P  D 
,$If r +B rr u r -- u U ' " N O U ~ ~ ~ L ~ ~ ~ ~ C ~ ~ + ; ~ N ~ ~ \ , U  C r r -u .r-r u .b  M U -r qo!+,oo.Ai .doy,pna Q % A .  
" ' U  U ' *  U rl *U,. 
- Z ~ ' a ~ ~  r) r l ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ m ~ r n o o w o r n r ~ . ~ w p o ~ ~ ~ r n ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  " "  L :Jq 
~ - N A ~ ~ - ~ . S ~ - % W ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ . ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  8 0 
TAsU 1 " (CO$,' d.) ,- , 
1 ,  Quadm 1 
, - -  - 
SOURCES: , 
FONTES : 393019 - p5314  1 
19!?4/5~~ 1 9 7 7 ) 5 ~ I n s t i ~ & b  tie 31gbd& ds kTo:bpatnbique: 
C o t t o n ' I n s t i t u t e  o f  Mozambique: 
d - 
* 3975 16 ' L. ,i.IR, 'Mapas Estatisticas 197516 Quadro/table 3 
- d 2 8 .  
* dados 40 publicados oabt idas  da ~ e c ~ g o  de E s t a t i s t i c a s ,  I. A. M, 
Ma chclv~, - 8 J # .  I 
unpublished da ta  from the S t a t i s t i c s  &&ion, I, A. FV., bAa.chcv,?, 
L 
I > 
' T A E E  2 :'  SEE^ COTTON PRODUCTION BY FORMS OF PRODUCTION 
(fonnes and percentages)  
1 
SOURCES J 
FONTES : 
Gcunp,aign 
Campanha - 
I.A,I:.I, R e l a t b r i o  1962-19D p, 156 F!iapa 111, p, 957 Rilapa IV; 
.**-C .Il- 
" R e l a t b r i o  3972 p, 9 Quadra 6; 
rr;*;e*zCuW 
" R e l a t b r i o  3974 p, 5 Quadra S; 
&U- 
l 1  
, , , Relatdr-io 1975 p, 5 Quadro 5; 
c- 
* I 1975/6 Quadro ,7 + 
Family s e c t o p  Private F a m ~  S t a t e  Fawns CooperatTGes T o t a l  
S e c t o r  Fmi l id r  A ~ A m ~ r j ~ p r i ~ a d ~  Rilachtm,.Estatals Coopera t ivas  T o t a l  
I 
I 
TABLE 3 : SEED COTTON PRODUCTION BY PROVINCES AND FORMS OF PRODUCTION 
& B  (~onnes) 
QUA~RO 3 : PRODU~$~O E ALGOD~O C A R ~ O  POR PRO~NCIAS E FORMAS DE PRODUGXO 
(~onelades)  
G A B 0  D E L G A D O  
Year Family sector Pr ivate  Famis State Farms Coopera2:ives T o t a l  
Aria - Sector Fm-iliar -Aut$mos/pr iva& !~4aeharn,Estatais Cooperativas ' T&%hl 
- .  
209 
; 293 
' E l l  . ' 
TABLE 3 ( ~ o n t ' d )  
QUADRO 3 
N A l i P U L A  . .- 
' Year F&flily ..se&ar P r i v a t e  Farms L ~ t a t ;  Farms Cooperatives Total.- 
Ano' . Sector Familiar  Autbnomos/primdos h4acharn ,Estata is Coaperntivas Total. 
C 
Z A M B E Z I A  
- 4  U 
TABLE 3 (can t i  d) 
QUADRO 3 
T E T E  
{mte Farms' A State" Farms C.aope+atii.ms TutnJL 
- Ano Bectur Familiar ~utdnomo/~rivcldcs bJa~bm,Estatais Coopomtivas To ta l  
, , 
196 1 /2 6; 14-9 - 
4962/3 2; 032 
1963/4 2; 740 
4 9&1/ 5 3; 620 
4965/6 2; 074 
1966/7 3: 026 
9967/8 2: 203 
19€D/9 2.938 
99&9/33 W $  .. 4 
1970/ 1 1,103 3: 947 
497 1 /2 ' l  703 4 : 094 
1972/3 294 " 5: f37 
'/973/4 17 19 : 20C 
1974/5 ' 5 9  1 : 726 
1925/6 3: 325 4: Ei03 
1976;/7 3; 000 4k251 
1977/8 4,343 4,531 
1970/9 
! J A N I C A  E S O F A L A  
" ,  W 
L 4 A P U T T O ,  G A Z A  E I N H A h l B A N E  
Year Family sector Prlvato Farms State Fams Cooperatives Total 
Am Sector Familiar ~utbrwmos/privados FJlacham,Estatais Cooperativas Total 
_ -  _ .  . 

Sources: IAN, Report for  1962-67, page 157, tsble  TV 
IAM, Report fo r  1972, page 3, -table 6 
P ?  FP 1974, page 5 table 5 
v7 EP 1375$ gage 5, table  5 
Note: This -tsI..de show tha t ,  althoug3 i t s  t o t a l  production has de@?j+n-dd, the  
qual i ty  of cottoil produced by the mozanbican peasantry ILLIS improved. 
Peas'mt production reached i ts  peak i n  1959/60, su'useq~ently maintaining 
a ldgh level  of prod-uc-iiion u n t i l  1969/70, vrhen i t s  share of t o t a l  production 
entered in-to a sus-tained d-ecline, Given tha t  1960/61 was the year i n  vhich 
forced labour was formctllg abolished, tre can see that the practice have 
coiltinued i n  other forms u n t i l  it effect ively disappeared i n  the ear ly 1970s. 
The ad-vance of %he armed struggle (par t icular ly i n  Tete province) a lso had 
a, marked influence on levels of peasant (and other) cotton production, 
Table 6 : 
Year 
1 954./5 
1955/6 
1 956/7 
1957/8 
1 9 58/9 
1 959/60 
1 960/1 
1961 /2 
1962/3 
1963/4 
1 964./5 
1 965/6 
1 966/7 
1 967/8 
1 968/9 
1 969/70 
1 970/1 
1 971 /2 
1 972/3 
1 973 /fl, 
1 974/5 
Total 
194 01712 
257 204 
389 88091 
671 55671 
998 102,2 
7 139 9 3 6 ~ 5  
l 302 057t3 
I 373 6 2 ~ ~ 3  
1 217 34OV7 
2 777 936,8 
3 108 542 
5 327 76095 
7 942 502,l 
14 055 674 
26 757 336 
46 41 0 008 
57 224 156 
77 574 876 
86 870 319 
89 809 796 
30 955 000 
Sources: IATI Report for 1962-67, po1 56, tr?,ble I11 
07 FO 1 972, 9.9, table 6 
FP F7 1 974,pe5, table 5 
E V  07 1975, p05, taZ)le 5 
, , S  : 
Note: It can be seen from the above table tha$ as soon as the o=ili@tory 
cultivation of cotton vsas abolished, colonial cepi-talists 5eg53~ to 
actively compete in cot'con productiono If the 1960s are a period of 
stagnation and change for the qotton producing peasantry, those same 
years are oneti .of rapid gro.c~th for capitalist farmers, From l971 
the capitalist sector doinimtes $he scene both in -i;em*ms of quantity 
and quality produced. 
68 
T A B 4  7 : CULTIVATED HECTARES BY FORMS OF PRODUCTION 
1 :! \ 
QUADRO 7 : H E C T ~ S  CULTIVADAS POR FORMAS DE PRODUGXO 
Year Family sector Pr ivate Fawns State farms Cooperatives 'Tota l  
Ano Sector Famil iar  Autbnomos/pr5vados ~!~!achm.Estatais Cooperativas To ta l  
194415 296: 000 
'l 945/6 232; 000 
994617 246; 000 
494718 233: 000 
4 94819 2%: 000 
4949/50 260; 000 
19%/ l 253: 000 
1951/2 2%; 000 
995213 275: 000 
495314 233: 000 
4954/5 282; 000 
495516 273: 000 
19 5617 30'3 : 000 
?957/3 30 1 3 000 
995819 312;OOO 
I ~ S / ~ O  297; oon 
1960/1 309 ; 000 
196112 302; 000 
196213 2%: 000 
'l 96314 324: 000 
496415 350: 000 
196516 3 S :  000 
196~/7 333:OOO L 
4967/0 37C: 000 
4968/5' 376,000 
19 W 190 
99701 1 
4971/2 ? , 
4972/3 
497314 
'l974/5 
4975/6 
497617 
1977/0 
1978/9 
SOURE$/ 
FONTES : N. S, Bmw : "A Cultura Algodoeira na Economia do Norto de Ftloqanl - 
bique" Quadro XXIZ; 
Table 
- U .  W .  
Fdapas Estat is t icas.  Quadro 3 197516, Quadm , 1977-p 
S t a t i s t i c a l  Tables, Table 1 1975/6, Table 197'7-7'3. 
TABLE 8 : CULTIVATED HEFTAES BY FORRlS OF PRODUCTION AND W PROVINCE 
, 
Q U N R O  8 : HECTARES CULTIVADOS POR FORhilAS DE PROD&~O E PROVINCIAS 
Yea* -. Private Stgte Caopeptiye FayiIy Ta$alP. 
'an0 b'rivcldos Estatais Coopo~akivas Fmili ar TofiaI 
- 8  
C A 6 0  D E L G A D 0  
N I A S S A  
T E T E  
TABLE 8 (Cont8d) 
QUADRO 0 
Year Pr iva te  S t a t e  cooperat ives Family To ta l  
Ano' Privados E s t a t a i s  Coo; crativas Familiar  To ta l  
I N H A M B A N E  
G A Z A  
SOURCES J r r i  
CC\TES : 1975/6 I.A.L1, sec$: de E s t o t i s t i c a s  - Quadro 1 - ~ m d u ~ g o  de 
, , , Almdao e s u a  Area p s  Provfncicl e Sector. 
1977&3 I ,A.hl ,  secca"o de E s t a t f ~ t i c a  - Campanhas AgrimLas- 
Year 
1 948 
1 953 
1958 
1 903 
l 968 
-l 973 
1978 

- U  L 
TABLE 11 : GINNED. CmTON PRWCED. 1961/2 - 1948/9 
v -  l 
QUADRO 11 : RMNS PRODUZIDAS 
Campanha ~ m ~ o r r $ o  dos t i p o s  "Extra, : ~ f i ~ o i - q g o  dos t i p o s  In[, ,' 
I e 11, IV, V, VI e " infer ior" ,  ' m* 
Cmpajign C/o sbn2 of  types  zExtra, 1 %'sham of types In, TV, 
and 11, .) V, V l  and. irrferior, 
FONE : Calwlated on t h ~  basis of d a t a  i n  table 6, 
CEllculado dos dados m quadm 6 
" ,  
TABLE 12 : PRODUCTION OF GINNED COTTON BY FACTORY 
(~onnes) 
- .  + 
I QUADRO 12 : RAMAS PRODUZIDAS POR INSTAL~&S 
a ( tonelades) 
Factories 74/5 75/6 76/7 77/9 78/9 
F&brIcas 
r l 
kCu~mba "530 731 932 1,306 044 
N;-hlutuali 1:374 3 -'517 -'g31 3 1  
CD.fJontepuoz 1.901 2,386 'l;365 1;963 606 
WNamapa 701 061 l 2,519 325 
N-Eeba -'E376 371 t;jclEt '071 -l367 
Mvlonapo 1;781 - ' % B  '402 2:048 1;7G3 
N-Namialo 2.132 1,122 3.254 2,093 1.961 
N-Nmet i l  " 354  - - ,  .. U '965 " '270 
IU-Nampule 1.3a 894 2,314 2,320 1.277 
k R i  bnue 602 302 467 533 1 s  
2-Alto Filolocue "453 601 - '235 - ' m 7  477 
2440 cu ba 1,235 624 1,565 1.331 031 
Z-fillocu be l a  206 307 219 ' 0 3  
Z4Bgdza 606 "792 “420 "099 IS 
T-D, Ana "'572 1,486 1:403 l "331 
M~4anga 1.743 4 1,628 2.436 1,230 
SYVila A r r i a p  2 1 128 136 105 177 
GXai Xai 34 1 113 0 .S. 
L C ~ O  cu6 107 70 32 22 33 
Chemba W 3 3 - 4  
Tanpmo W L I 123 
GOURESI ' #: d .  , 
FONTES : I:A;M.";:, Relatdrio 11374/5, p,7 quadro 7, 
I A , ?  ~ e c ~ g o  " dc Estat f  Sticas, Ramos Pmduddos par Insto- 
la~oes,  quadm 4, 
W 
I-I 
C., 
e- S" 
- 1 I 
TABLE 14 : ABSORPTION OF GINNED COTTOl?J : EXPORTS AND NATIONAL INDUSTRY 
Year Exports National Indus t ry  ~tners(dmaged; unused, I n  tons 
, balm&, e tc )  
* ,Ano ~ x ~ o r t a ~ " a  Indcistr ia  Nacion, ~u t ros (a rd ido ,  i n u t i l i z a -  Em tonela-  
do, saldo, etcr das. 
- 
SCURCE J 
FONfE : Calcu1ated fm data in F i guse 7 
CalcuZado dos dadas ~ i ~ ~ ~ $  7 .  
" .  
TABLE 15, ;. LOCAL TNDUSTRY~ 'jlJ AOSORPTION OF TYPES "EXTRAff, I AND PI . 
, *  ." 
I \  ' 
a 
.. , -:. 2 
f l 
- WADRO 35 : INDUSTRIA NACIDNAL: ABSORB~$O DAS RAWS E TIP0 
"EXTRA", I E I1 PRODUZIOaS 
E"tra9' ' All Grades used Zwtra,I,lI as 
uzeed/utiliza-'o Todos Eraus % of total used/ 
(~onnes/~ndo) 
- r ,  r 
atilizadao(tonnes) %dbsorbo~o do Extra 
H E! 51. 
3961/2 1,127 34,746 3,24$ 
- 1962/3 - .  396 24,679 4, o~c,! 
3963/4 3 . 1 ~ 9  35,437 3, aw: 
1964./5 3.272; 24.034 5,1$ 
SOURCE( 
FONTE : C a l c u l a t e d  f m m  Bats ih previous tables, 
Calcu lado  dos dadas nos quadros anteriores , 
TABLE 16 : GINNED COTTON EXPORTED BY DESTWATPON. 
(~onnes and percentage) 
- 1  
C 
QUADRO 16 : RAMAS EXPORTADOS POR PAIS 
(~onelades e percentagem) 
.. . .-. . ,"l  
, 
Year Portugal Hong Kong England- Y.%st 6, Anty!cjp Others  and ~ o t a k s  
b " unspecif e d  
E ngla- / a  , Outros t o t a i s  
A m  t e r m  R.F,A, Adueip ia ngo ospocif.i* Tokais 
W 
cados 
SOURCES/ , , , V .  L‘ 
FONTES I m A s l J = p  
1972 p; 43, quadro 10; 
4974 p; 40, quadro 9; 
/ d ,  1975 p. '10; ' 
I*Ae!d. 1376 - 1979, 
TPJ3LE 17: GIKNED COTTON EXPORTED BY EXPORTEiIS 
;./ 
. 1 
QUADRO 17 W l A S  EXPORTADAS POR EPORTKDO~WS 
Source: Table 12 IM4 Report 197Ws p. 12 (Kilogrammes) 
Fonte: Quadro 12 IAM Relat6rio 1974/5 p.12 ( ~ u i l o ~ r a m a s )  
I Comanhia 159.312 378.277 - .  402.868 
- -Nacianal - - 
Algodoeira 
Souedade q.258.170 907.684 
Algodoeira 
% do Zambeze 
C i a ,  dos 56.l1br 1.632,3l+O 2.284.216 
A;lgod%es de 
.Mac. 
dos Santos 
SlJq J.F.S. 519.946 706.820 1.271.623 
Soc. Agric . l. 377.870 592.347 
ALgod. ( SIIGfL ) 
Textimpex - 26.108 73.825 
Metochbiz 248.898 
Agrf caEz 
Q!.uintz dcls 59.1;07 
Laranjeiras 
L, Came c 330 -479 
Irmaos > A  
Bmco de 100.605 
Moc . 
Autorzoao S 635.901 502,071!- 341 .g80 
dlversos , 
(Various 
Companies) 
+Data 
u n t i l  
March 
'1 979 ( +dados 
at6 
Marco 
7979) 
I . .  
